

The Evacuation of the Chalcots Estate

An Independent Review

Prepared by
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1. Introduction

1.1 The London Borough of Camden (the council) has commissioned an independent review of matters arising from their decision in June 2017 to evacuate four tower blocks on the Chalcots Estate. The review is to be conducted in two phases. The first phase of the review considers the decision to evacuate the blocks, the process of evacuation, communications during that evacuation process and the decision that the blocks were safe for re-occupation. The second phase of the review will look at wider issues of fire safety in the blocks. This report sets out the process and findings of the first phase of the review, which began in December 2017.

1.2 The Terms of Reference¹ were drawn up by the independent lead reviewer, Mrs Marian Harrington, informed by a list of questions produced by residents of the blocks. An advisor, Mr Alan McCarthy, conducted the elements of the review relating to building works undertaken following the evacuation and the decision that the blocks were safe for re-occupation. Biographies for Mrs Harrington and Mr McCarthy are at Appendix 2.

1.3 The review analysed documents, both contemporaneous and retrospective, produced by the council and partner organisations. The review was further informed by independent technical reports commissioned by the council. The lead reviewer met with residents and representatives of tenants' and residents' associations in the blocks affected. Interviews were conducted with a wide range of Camden Council employees and contractors who had been involved in the evacuation and with councillors from the Conservative and Labour parties. The Green Party councillor also requested a meeting and fed in her views. Interviews were also conducted with senior representatives of the London Fire Brigade (LFB), Metropolitan Police Service, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG), the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority and London Resilience². Voluntary organisations involved in supporting residents during and after the evacuation were also interviewed. In total 32 people were interviewed in addition to the meetings with Chalcots residents. The reviewers made two site visits. In addition a dedicated e-mail account was set up for information and comments to be sent to the reviewers.

¹ Appendix 1: Terms of Reference

² The London Resilience Partnership brings together over 170 organisations with responsibilities for preparing for and responding to emergencies.

Questionnaires were also sent to all residents and 49 of these were completed and returned. The engagement plan is attached at Appendix 3.

1.4 The Chalcots Estate is made up of five tower blocks. Taplow, Bray, Burnham and Dorney are 23 storeys high and Blashford is 19 storeys. The blocks were built in 1967 and 1968. Some residents have lived there since the blocks were first occupied. The estate is situated towards the north of the London Borough of Camden near Swiss Cottage and overlooking Primrose Hill. The estate was significantly refurbished between 2006 and 2009. That refurbishment included the overhaul of the roofs, installation of external thermal rain screen cladding and new windows. The flats were also refurbished with new kitchens, bathrooms and rewiring. Communal areas were refurbished and new electrical risers and a door entry system were installed.

2. The decision to evacuate

2.1 On 14th June 2017 in the early hours of the morning a fire broke out in Grenfell Tower in the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (K&C) with devastating results. Official records show 71 people lost their lives and many more were injured. The rapid spread of the fire was attributed to flammable cladding and insulation which had been fitted to the block. Officers of Camden Council identified potential similarities between Grenfell and a number of tower blocks owned and managed by the council. Among the similarities were the cladding systems and shared contractors, including Rydon and Harley Curtain Wall.

2.2 On 19th June 2017 the MHCLG established and distributed requirements to local authorities and housing associations regarding a testing regime for aluminium composite material (ACM) cladding, as it was believed that this may have contributed to the fire at Grenfell Tower. Local authorities and housing associations were asked to identify all cladding systems on high-rise residential buildings and, where ACM was identified, to submit samples of cladding tiles to the MHCLG and the Building Research Establishment (BRE) for testing. In Camden, during the week commencing 19th June 2017, officers of the council and LFB officers visited the site on a number of occasions.

2.3 On 21st June 2017, as well as removing samples for testing, the council carried out some inspections at the Burnham block. Officers identified that the tiles were backed by Rockwool insulation and the building had fire breaks between the floors. It was believed that these protective measures had not been in place at Grenfell Tower.

2.4 On the same day the council held a briefing for elected members. Officers had identified that there had previously been a fire at one of the blocks, Taplow. On that occasion the flat burnt out to its concrete surround but the fire was then contained.

This was said to demonstrate that the compartmentation of the flats, a fundamental design requirement, had been successful in preventing the spread of fire. This provided some reassurance as to the safety of the Chalcots buildings.

2.5 At approximately 7pm on that day the test results from BRE were received over the phone at the council. The results indicated that all the tiles submitted had been found to be unsatisfactory.

2.6 The Leader of the Council, Ms Georgia Gould, met that evening with two senior council officers, the Chief Executive (Mr Mike Cooke) and the Executive Director, Supporting Communities (Ms Jenny Rowlands), to discuss the results. They agreed to announce an intention to remove the cladding. Until that had been done they would initiate a programme of interim safety measures including fire wardens across all the blocks day and night, free portable appliance testing for domestic appliances for all residents and the issue of fire blankets for residents.

2.7 On 22nd June 2017 officers of the council hand-delivered letters to all residents of the five blocks, announcing the results of the testing and the intention to remove the cladding. The council organised a public meeting at Swiss Cottage Library on the same evening to discuss the results of the testing and the interim safety measures which could be put in place.

2.8 More than 100 residents attended that meeting, which was addressed by the LFB Borough Commander, Mr Simon Tuhill, and, from the council, the Leader Georgia Gould, Deputy Leader Pat Callaghan, Chief Executive Mike Cooke, Executive Director, Supporting Communities Jenny Rowlands and the Head of Better Homes Delivery Mr Pat O'Neill. They explained that, while there were similarities in the cladding between the Chalcots buildings and Grenfell Tower, the insulation used in Chalcots was not considered to be flammable in the same way as that used in Grenfell Tower. It was therefore said that the buildings could safely remain occupied during the proposed removal of the cladding from the outside of all of the buildings.

2.9 Residents, particularly those with young children, expressed their concerns about safety in the blocks in the event of a fire. From many of their flats Grenfell Tower could be seen, a constant reminder to residents of the risk they felt they might be in.

2.10 The Council proposed a number of safety measures including fire marshals on duty day and night, security on site and the provision of a fire blanket to every household. Residents raised a number of concerns relating to sprinklers, fire alarms and the "stay put" advice from the LFB - that is, the advice that in the event of fires it is often more dangerous to leave premises than to remain within them while the fire is tackled.

2.11 The following morning, Friday 23rd June 2017, an LFB officer came to the estate to carry out an inspection. This was part of a programme of LFB inspections of high rise buildings which were believed to have cladding similar to Grenfell Tower.

Because Camden had carried out the tests very soon after the Grenfell Tower fire and the cladding had been confirmed as similar, this was one of the first such inspections carried out by the LFB.

2.12 This LFB officer found issues which concerned him and asked for assistance. Colleagues attended, including an LFB Assistant Commissioner who was also a qualified fire engineer. They conducted an in depth examination, initially of Taplow block. They judged that fire resistance in the communal areas was unsatisfactory and that this would affect the ability of the residents of the block to be safely evacuated in the event of a fire. It would also mean that the advice to residents to stay put in their flats was not appropriate as fire resistance could not be guaranteed.

2.13 The areas which were identified by the LFB as causing fire risk were provided to the Council as a handwritten list which is transcribed verbatim, in italics, below:

Car Park Fire Stopping

- *Fire stopping issues throughout the basement*
- *Access to main plant room unavailable*

Firefighting access/information

- *Access to door on roadway, no key*
- *PIB broken*
- *Vent panel/keys instructions*

Flat front doors

- *Fire resistance – notional*
- *No self closures*
- *No strips and seals*
- *No fire resistance above door/fanlight or boarding*
- *Frame gaps at top of frame at ceiling level*
- *Cable penetrations through top of frames at most doors*

Feed to flats

- *At some levels penetrations to from lobby to flat sealed with yellow foam*

Electrical risers

- *Fires stopping above doors breached on most floors*
- *Cable trays breach fire resisting enclosure with inadequate fire stopping*
- *Vertical stopping between floor inadequate*
- *Combustible storage in some cupboards*

Gas risers

- *Unclear if shaft is vertically fire resisting*
- *Compartment floor fire stopping needs survey if enclosure not fire resisting*

Lobby/Staircase doors

- *Self closures need adjustment*
- *No strips + seals*

Lower/ground floor

- *Staircase vent needs to be confirmed re routing requirement*
- *Walking watch needs to be active/mobile and have tight brief + communication between each other*

2.14 Senior council officers attended the estate and discussions began about steps which could be put in place to mitigate these risks. Officers and elected members were clear that they would take any steps necessary to avoid evacuation of the block. They suggested that having two fire wardens on every floor 24 hours a day which would ensure early identification if a fire broke out. These wardens would have equipment to ensure that they could raise the alarm audibly for residents night and day. It was also suggested that the council could fund a fire tender to be stationed at the blocks. The LFB advised that they could not provide this arrangement as this would reduce their ability to respond to fires elsewhere. The council managed to source fire tenders from a private company and these were offered as a mitigation of the risk to residents. The Council also agreed to start immediate installation of door closers and the installation of a temporary radio fire alarm system in the common areas.

2.15 However the LFB advice was that none of these measures, or any of them in combination, could lessen the risk sufficiently to avoid the evacuation of the blocks. The senior LFB officer said that if the Council resisted the recommendation to evacuate the LFB would serve a *Prohibition Notice under Article 31* to compel the immediate evacuation of all the blocks on the estate.

2.16 Article 31, Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 is the most stringent measure that can be instigated by a Fire Authority. It provides the enforcing Fire Authority, in this case the LFB, with a power to act in cases where it is necessary to prohibit or restrict the use of premises to ensure the safety of residents. A prohibition notice must state the enforcing authority's opinion that the use of the premises involves (or will involve) a risk to relevant persons so serious that use of the premises ought to be prohibited or restricted. It should specify the matters which in their opinion give rise to the risk and direct that such use be prohibited or restricted until the specified matters have been remedied.

2.17 Discussions between the Council and the LFB continued, seeking to mitigate the effects of an evacuation. An Article 31 order, if served by the LFB, would have meant that all residents would have had to be evacuated urgently and not allowed to return to their homes. It was clear that there were significant numbers of older people living in the block and other vulnerable residents for whom special arrangements would need to be made.

2.18 These discussions took place during the day of 23rd June 2017. The issues were escalated to the MHCLG and the Greater London Assembly (GLA), specifically the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority³ (LFEPA), and directly to the LFEPA Chair. The Leader of the Council arrived at the blocks in the late afternoon and shortly after this the decision was made to evacuate Taplow. By this time it was after 5pm on a Friday night. The council's emergency planning arrangements were initiated. LFB officers went on to inspect the other four blocks to investigate whether there were similar issues which compromised fire safety.

2.19 In order to give some flexibility for residents who could not or would not move and to allow residents the opportunity to return to their flats to collect belongings, the council took control of the evacuation as owners of the buildings. The Metropolitan Police Service had become involved and attended the evacuation to prevent any breach of the peace and to ensure public safety. They did not attend to enforce the evacuation or to require any resident to leave their home.

Commentary on the decision to evacuate

2.20 The consequences of the decision to evacuate should not be under-estimated. All of the residents I met and many who submitted information had experienced some degree of trauma as a result of the evacuation. For some people pre-existing mental health problems were exacerbated.

2.21 Some residents have raised the issue that journalists had discussed a possible evacuation with them days before it occurred. This has led them to suspect that the council knew that an evacuation was planned. I have found no evidence that the evacuation was planned in the days before it took place. Indeed many of the issues the Council faced during the evacuation would not have occurred if the Council had had more time to plan the evacuation.

2.22 In my discussions with the LFB they have remained absolutely clear that they were so concerned about the state of the fire proofing in the blocks that, if the council had resisted their advice, they would have served a Prohibition Notice under Article 31 to compel the immediate evacuation of all but one of the blocks on the estate.

³ The LFEPA is a body reporting to the GLA. Its principal purpose is to run the LFB.

2.23 The LFB apparently judged that the “stay put” advice (that people should remain in their homes because the doors and fire proofing would prevent fire from spreading) was not appropriate in this situation. The LFB had found that fire proofing had been compromised by holes drilled into doors and panels above doors, and that there were also potential problems with gas risers. Consequently they could not guarantee that a fire would not spread. With the numbers of people living in the blocks – which all have only one fire escape - evacuation once a fire had been detected would not have been a safe or practical proposition. Moreover, that fire escape would be the only means of access for fire fighters so that a wholesale evacuation would also have impeded them.

2.24 This gives an indication of the extremely serious nature of the concerns the LFB expressed about the fire safety in the blocks. In the light of this advice, and the threat of a Prohibition Notice, it would have been extremely difficult for the Leader of the Council and the Chief Executive to have ignored this expert advice and to have followed any path other than the evacuation of the Chalcots blocks. The LFB has expressed the view that this voluntary evacuation carried out by the Council was preferable in their view to the issuing of an Article 31 notice because of the flexibility this afforded.

2.25 However this is the only instance in the country, following the Grenfell Tower fire, where an evacuation was required. In other places where similar problems were identified remedial works were carried out without an evacuation being necessary. In relation to the Chalcots evacuation I have not seen any evidence of an assessment, or even of any consideration, by any of the agencies of the risks to individuals of being evacuated. A third of households with people aged 65 and over did not leave their flats and I have assumed that this is because some older people felt this would be too disruptive and difficult for them to cope with. Some of the residents of the blocks were receiving end of life care in their homes. For all these people any move would have been dangerous, certainly a more imminent risk than the risk of a fire in the block.

2.26 Residents have also questioned whether it was absolutely essential to evacuate the blocks immediately - in the middle of the night. Most felt that a planned evacuation over the weekend and into the next working week would have been more dignified and organised. Council officers tried to negotiate this with the LFB without success.

2.27 All of the council’s officers with whom I spoke described difficulties in dealing with the senior LFB officer on site when the advice to evacuate was given. They felt that he did not seem to wish to negotiate any mitigations or allow the council any time to put emergency repairs in place. He is said to have repeatedly insisted that all the work needed to take place during the evening of the 23rd June - clearly an impractical requirement - or an Article 31 notice would be served, which would

require complete evacuation. This officer was not made available to this review by the LFB as he has now retired.

2.28 On this evening the LFB made a decision which fundamentally affected the lives of thousands of individuals and committed the council to expenditure running into millions of pounds. Costs, for temporary accommodation and security measures alone, totalled nearly £15 million. It would seem appropriate for the LFB to consider the risks to individuals in being evacuated, particularly vulnerable people and balance this against their fire risk.

3. The process of the evacuation

3.1 The evacuation of the Chalcots estate was probably the largest evacuation in the country since World War II. The four blocks which were eventually evacuated housed 2103 people in 636 households at the time of the evacuation.

- Taplow: 604 residents in 158 households
- Bray: 461 residents in 157 household
- Dorney: 570 residents in 159 households
- Burnham: 468 residents in 162 households

3.2 The evacuation commenced on a Friday night after the great majority of council staff had finished work and gone home. The council set up a rest centre in the Swiss Cottage Leisure centre and a backup rest centre in the Camden Centre near Kings Cross. In addition Mutual Aid was initiated which is a system whereby support is requested from other local authorities. Westminster City Council prepared a rest centre at Seymour Leisure Centre in Marylebone. By 11pm on the 23rd June 2017 80 to 100 volunteers, council officers who had returned to work, were either working in the blocks or at the rest centre in Swiss Cottage.

3.3 During the evening and through the night council staff carried out a process of knocking on doors, informing residents of the evacuation and asking them to leave their homes. Local councillors from across the political spectrum, including the Leader of the council, took part in the door knocking. Residents were provided with a letter⁴ setting out the circumstances of the evacuation, and asking them to go downstairs to the lobby of their block where council staff would provide information and support.

3.4 At 2.30 am the LFB confirmed that residents did not need to leave Blashford block. This was because that block is smaller than the other blocks and the fire doors in Blashford are substantially different to those in the other blocks so that fire safety deficiencies were not so severe. Also, that day there had already been works to clear corridors and enhance fire safety.

⁴Appendix 4: Letter to residents

3.5 Many residents in the blocks being evacuated decided to stay in their homes rather than go and sleep in the leisure centre. Air beds had been set up there but these were not suitable for people with disabilities and older people. Some women were not comfortable to be sleeping in the same room as men who were not known to them or their families. Fire wardens were provided in blocks where residents remained in place.

3.6 During the night a decision was taken by the council to employ security guards at all the blocks to restrict access. Some residents, who had left their flats to try to find out what was going on or get something to eat, had extreme difficulty in getting back to their homes.

3.7 In the early hours of Saturday morning the senior LFB officer, who had been on site when the decision to evacuate was taken, was replaced by a colleague. At 4.20 am that LFB officer advised that the council could stop knocking on the doors of the households which had not been evacuated. By this time there were 100 residents at the Swiss Cottage leisure centre, 80 of whom were sleeping there. 38 households had been put up in hotels and 273 hotel rooms had been booked. 200 households had chosen to stay with relatives or friends, and taxis had been provided to take people wherever they needed to go.

3.8 Residents were able to return to the blocks to pick up belongings from 7:00am. These visits, which were restricted to 30 minutes, were overseen by security staff with residents tracked in and out. At 9:00am the LFB requested that door knocking begin again, asking residents to leave their homes.

3.9 NHS England offered to coordinate all aspects of health provision. A local GP attended the Swiss Cottage rest centre providing consultations for residents and prescriptions where they were needed.

3.10 At the leisure centre, volunteers were bringing in food and the café was providing free food for those who were evacuated. By Sunday 25th June 2017 there were 38 people sleeping in the rest centre. An Eid celebration was organised in a nearby community centre. Every household was given £100 to cover emergency costs and £20 per day per person on an ongoing basis.

3.11 Various steps were taken to try to meet the accommodation needs of residents. The council allocated a daily amount of £200 per hotel room per night for accommodation for up to 14 days. Some of the residents on the estate supported others in trying to identify suitable accommodation. The council also identified unoccupied properties for people to move to. These included new build flats, recently refurbished flats and vacant and guest flats in sheltered housing.

3.12 The blocks contained significant numbers of older people and people with particular support needs. 54 households consisted of people over 65 years living alone. 35 residents were receiving services from the Adults Social Care Department

of the council. Other residents were known to, and receiving services from, the local mental health trust (Camden and Islington Foundation Trust). The council established a team of 11 social workers and other social care staff to work with those residents who might need support from Adult Social Care services. These officers usually worked at hospitals so were accustomed to working with people in crisis. During the evacuation period 150 new people were screened by this team. Each of the people referred was assessed by an allocated worker and 80 went on to receive services from Adult Social Care after the evacuation. They worked alongside Ward Housing Officers who were based on site to support residents directly.

3.13 By 26th June 2017 541 flats had been vacated on the estate while 103 remained occupied. By 30th June 2017 the rest centre had been closed. After this period staff were based in the ground floors of the blocks to answer questions and provide information and support.

Commentary on the process of evacuation

Clarity about the right to remain

3.14 Some residents have reported that nobody knocked on their door on the first night of the evacuation and that they did not receive any formal notification from the council. Nonetheless it is clear that the council did put in place a major and immediate programme of personal visits to all properties and that many residents did have personal contact from staff and a letter about the situation.

3.15 However, there was a lack of clarity and consistency about whether or not the council **could** require people to leave their homes, and whether or not the council **was** requiring people to leave their homes. In fact, in these circumstances, the council had no legal authority to require that people were evacuated. The letter distributed to residents does not explicitly state whether the evacuation was voluntary or compulsory. It does not explain that residents had the right to remain in their homes.

3.16 There were inevitable difficulties in ensuring that a consistent message was given. We have seen evidence that some staff did not understand the legal situation so that this was not explained consistently to those being evacuated. Some residents heard of the evacuation through TV news, social media or phone calls from friends and relatives. In an age of social media and fast communications this seems unavoidable. The number of door knockers available would never have been able to get around almost 650 flats before the news spread in other ways.

3.17 However the fundamental lack of clarity about any requirement to evacuate is a serious failing. Residents should have been helped to understand what their rights and responsibilities were in this situation and make their own decision. This was

compounded by the change of advice from LFB; from requiring total evacuation, to tolerating some residents remaining in their homes. It would have been difficult for the Council to explain why these shifts were taking place. This may have marked the start of a lack of trust between the Council and some residents who felt they were deliberately not told the whole truth.

Use of emergency planning arrangements

3.18 Council emergency plans are unlikely to be designed for emergencies on this scale. Most major incidents or emergencies are led by one of the emergency services with the local authority providing support, often in the form of humanitarian assistance. In this instance the council was leading the response with support from London Gold⁵ and London Resilience.

3.19 While the emergency plan helped to establish the key structures and processes there were some problems with its implementation. The council's emergency planning service was not at full capacity at this time due to a mixture of sickness absence, annual leave and vacant posts. Key staff including senior managers were not sufficiently familiar with the plan.

3.20 There were problems with the recording of individuals and households when they reported to the leisure centre. Over the course of the first weekend the way the recording was carried out changed. The first information collection did not gather adequate information on the size and composition of households. Some residents have reported they had had to give their information three times in order to be properly registered and provided with a full response.

3.21 For future emergencies a standard form should be developed and an electronic database made available rather than piles of paper forms. In the case of an emergency involving evacuation of homes it would be better to use the address as the unique identifier for households.

3.22 Some residents reported that they did not find council staff helpful during the evacuation. Others were much more positive about the support that was provided to them. However, while the number of volunteers from Camden staff and other London local authorities was impressive, it was important to plan how they would be relieved from duty to ensure they were not working excessive hours. By 25th June 2017 effective systems had been established and there was clarity about the numbers of workers who were needed and where they would be deployed.

3.23 The decision to use security staff at the blocks has been criticised by some residents, who felt that their civil rights were being infringed or denied. Moreover every resident with whom I spoke reported very negative experiences of their

⁵ London Gold refers to the gold–silver–bronze structure used by emergency services for the command and control of major incidents and disasters.

dealings with the security staff. Some people who were returning home from work or a night out were denied access to their homes. Many people described the security staff as intimidating. Some people reported experiencing verbal abuse from the security staff and there were even allegations of scuffles between residents and the security staff in some blocks.

3.24 The only security staff available at short notice on a Friday night were from private security companies and were probably not the people best suited to such a sensitive operation. They themselves were probably unclear about why they were there, but it may be that briefing and control of these staff could have been improved.

3.25 Leadership in the evacuation period was variable: Some managers have skills and experience which make them more suited to emergency response. It is important that efficient processes are established at an early stage and that individual managers do not change these without the necessary authorisation. Some areas such as managing shift patterns, rotas and handovers could have been improved during the evacuation. It was also noted that staff with specific skills, such as data collection and information management, were not deployed in a way which made best use of those skills.

3.26 There are opportunities for the council to improve these aspects of the emergency planning process and providing training for key staff. The council has already identified these areas for improvement and has set about addressing them.

Arrangements for accommodation and rehousing

3.27 Arrangements for prioritising those households which needed rehousing were not developed at an early stage. Some residents were offered hotel rooms in locations from which they could not get to work or get their children to school. This was often the reason why households refused offers of accommodation. Some more detailed work on the needs of households at an early stage might have saved time and money.

3.28 There were significant problems in booking hotel rooms. The scale of the task of urgently finding alternative accommodation for such a large number of people was huge. This was the summer period in London and rooms were at a premium. Using established booking sites only served to push up the price of rooms as demand was increasing. The council made attempts to contact hotel chains to try to book rooms but this did not result in offers of suitable accommodation. 270 hotel rooms were booked on the first night of evacuation but there were still problems with residents arriving at hotels and being told that no room was available.

3.29 A problem emerged with the council's credit cards. These have a limit imposed by the council in order to prevent fraud. The scale of purchasing hotel rooms even on that first night meant that the limits were exceeded on many of the cards. There is an

Emergency Planning Purchase card with a high credit limit held by the Emergency Planning service but front-line staff were not aware of this and it was not used.

3.30 Some households tried to use Airbnb but this was generally unsuccessful. We heard that some landlords withdrew offers when they discovered that those seeking accommodation were from the Chalcots estate. This inevitably left residents feeling further stigmatised. The council has also reported that some rentals offered on line turned out to be fictitious, so that some residents lost deposits and had to be reimbursed by the council.

3.31 Some residents felt that the allocation of rooms was not done fairly. Others did not feel their needs were understood and that consequently they were offered unsuitable accommodation. There was initially a real problem in finding suitable accommodation for people with pets and a lack of understanding that people would not be evacuated and leave their pets behind. The council has recognised that a thorough assessment of the needs of residents by suitably trained staff early in the evacuation process could have saved time and ensured suitable offers of accommodation were made.

3.32 It is difficult to see how some of these problems could have been avoided, given the scale and urgency of the task. However London Resilience is proposing to work with hotel chains on a London wide basis to try to establish a system of access to rooms in emergencies.

Vulnerable residents

3.33 Some residents have said that vulnerable people should have been given more support during the evacuation. However I have seen evidence of very good work with vulnerable people during these events, and the use of innovative solutions to meet people's needs during the evacuation. For example, a group of people with significant support needs were moved together into alternative accommodation with no disruption to their support packages or friendship groups. This took some time to organise and could not have been achieved if the Article 31 Prohibition Notice had been served.

3.34 Special arrangements were made for children affected by the evacuation. Voluntary organisations, churches and local schools opened their doors and organised events for them. Protected space was identified for children to do their homework and study in peace.

3.35 A positive consequence of the evacuation is that unmet need for adult social care services was identified and services were provided to significant numbers of new people. The Adult Social Care staff found the work fulfilling and many formed good relationships with the vulnerable residents and their carers. The Adult Social Care Department has decided that in any future major incident, rather than the

traditional response of a rota of volunteers, they will allocate a dedicated team of workers to provide a specialist and consistent response.

3.36 Some residents spoke positively of the support and services they received from NHS mental health services. Both the Tavistock and Portman NHS Foundation Trust and the Camden and Islington NHS Foundation Trust worked with some of the residents.

The media

3.37 The council was keen to ensure an open and transparent relationship with the media. They recognised the huge media interest in the evacuation and wanted to be seen to answer questions honestly and openly. The Leader of the council was clear that she should personally answer media questions about the evacuation.

3.38 Tower block safety and even the Chalcots estate specifically were already at the top of the news agenda prior to the evacuation. The media had been outside the blocks of flats on 22nd June 2017 when Camden became the first council in the country to announce they would be removing the cladding from five towers on the Chalcots estate. This had been reported on all news programmes on TV and radio.

3.39 Following the decision to evacuate, the Leader conducted an interview for news media outside the blocks to ensure accurate information concerning the evacuation was reported.

3.40 There was then an ever increasing media presence at the estate, mostly outside Taplow block. Some residents have reported feeling humiliated, when evacuated, at having to walk with their children and clutching their possessions through this large group of media representatives and TV cameras. They said that the council staff refused permission for them to leave by the rear of the building. This has led to some people now feeling that the council was deliberately trying to generate positive publicity for their proactive response to the emergency, though I have seen nothing to substantiate that claim.

3.41 Some people who spoke to the news media when approached outside the blocks now regret the media coverage which followed. Other felt it was important that they were able to put their views forward.

Communications

3.42 In any major incident good communications are essential. This includes communication within and between agencies, and communications with members of the public. In addition, as we have seen, a major incident such as this will generate interest from the media and central government.

3.43 Communications with residents did not start well. Residents were told, by the LFB and the council, that there were sufficient differences between the cladding on

the Chalcots blocks and that on Grenfell Tower to prevent any evacuation. However, by the following day the situation had completely changed, and the council was in a position of having to evacuate. This was in the context of fast moving national guidance on cladding. This may have left residents feeling confused and cautious about the council's approach.

3.44 Once the decision to evacuate was taken, there is evidence that communication with residents was given a high priority. The council set up:

- A 24 hour Chalcots' resident helpline.
- A Chalcots specific e-mail address.
- A 24 hour information point at the Swiss Cottage rest centre operated by council support staff.
- A 24 hour information point at the Tenant and Resident Association office at Taplow block, supported by council staff at the blocks.
- Fire wardens and security staff at the Chalcots estate, who were briefed daily to ensure continuity.
- Council support staff located at the three main hotels used to provide temporary accommodation for residents.
- Posters on all floors of each building / doors to provide information and direct people to the 24 hour helpline / support centres.
- A dedicated Chalcots information area on the council's website to host latest news and FAQs.
- The front page of the website was held to provide latest news about the Chalcots situation.
- Facebook and Twitter were regularly updated, news items were tweeted and a team was available, 24 hours a day, to respond to queries from Chalcots residents on social media.
- Frequently raised queries on social media, or passed on from support staff on the ground, were fed into a FAQ document which was regularly reviewed and updated.

3.45 This is an extremely comprehensive programme of communication and demonstrates evidence of the commitment of the council to this area. Residents report that some of these initiatives were more useful than others. Ideally residents would have liked a named worker to communicate with, as they said that calls to the helpline resulted in speaking to a new person and retelling their story each time. They also reported that e-mails did not always get answered promptly or comprehensively. However I have heard almost universal praise for the presence and availability of the Leader of the council, local councillors from various parties and senior council officers, to meet residents face to face and answer their questions. Many residents told me that they appreciated the way that the council staff at the blocks communicated with them.

4. Completion of works and the residents' return.

4.1 A specification for work to be carried out prior to re-occupation was developed and agreed by council technical staff and framework property consultants / fire engineers and a third party fire proofing specialist. This was based on the handwritten note provided by the LFB. The council had already mobilised contractors on site from 23rd June to start priority remedial works required. Appropriately qualified and, where necessary, specialist framework contractors were employed to carry out the work. It is notable that the council was able to mobilise these resources at short notice. The contractors employed on each block were:

- Blashford – Wates, Mulalley, Openview & GEM
- Bray – Kier, Openview & GEM
- Burnham – Wates, Mulalley, Openview & GEM
- Dorney – Kier, Openview & GEM
- Taplow – Kier, Openview & GEM

4.2 Work progressed from ground floor in each of the blocks, with the works undertaken by Kier, Wates & Mulalley being signed off on-site for each floor to confirm satisfactory completion and compliance of work.

4.3 On 11th July 2017 the LFB visited the Chalcots Estate and confirmed that the works completed to date were sufficient to allow floor by floor release for re-occupation by residents, provided the works had been signed off by independent local authority building control services.

4.4 In the event each sign off sheet was approved by an independent third party fire proofing company, Euro Compliance, and by independent local authority building control departments of the London Boroughs of Lambeth and Westminster. Validation letters were also provided by each of the building control authorities confirming the signatures of the on-site operatives who inspected and passed the works. The works signed off prior to re-occupation were:

- Doors to stairwells
- Intermediate doors leading to different communal areas
- Riser cupboards
- Gas service duct/compartment
- Communal windows
- Front entrance doors
- Floor signage
- Vent terminals
- Boxing of services

All these works are itemised in detail in Appendix 5 within the report referred to in paragraph 4.8 below.

4.5 The floor by floor release of the blocks began on 12th July 2017. The council completed the works required for re-occupation on all floors of all blocks on 22nd July 2017. (Isolated elements of work may not have been completed at this time – for example, door closers on a limited number of flat entrance doors - but the LFB agreed the works had been completed to a level that would allow re-occupation).

4.6 It was also on 12th July that LFB served Enforcement Notices – the first written communication to the council from LFB since the handwritten note of 23rd June. In response *Summary Compliance Documents* were produced by the council for each of the blocks to address the areas of concern noted by the LFB. These documents recorded the actions taken to deal with the matters raised by the LFB and how compliance was managed, achieved and signed off.

4.7 The Enforcement Notices required all steps to be taken by 23rd August 2017. LFB carried out a formal inspection on 22nd August 2017 and noted that some matters were outstanding. The deadline for completion of the works was extended to 16th October 2017 but in fact all works were completed on 5th October 2017. LFB carried out a further inspection on 8th October 2017 and informally indicated that full compliance with the Enforcement Notices had been achieved. This was confirmed by LFB in a letter dated 16th November 2017.

4.8 In July Capital Property & Construction Consultants had been commissioned by the council to prepare a *Compliance Overview Report for the LFB Enforcement Notices at Chalcots Estate*. This report, which was issued on 29th November 2017, gives a detailed account of the steps taken by the council to comply with the Enforcement Notices. The report provides assurance regarding compliance with the Enforcement Notices, as was confirmed by LFB in their letter of 16th November 2017. The report includes these documents:

- Enforcement Notices *Summary Compliance Documents*.
- Remedial Works Action, including detail on the remedial works.
- Specifications for the remedial works.
- Third Party sign off documentation for the specialist work, including remedial works and Automatic Operating Vents (AOV) commissioning reports.
- Completed sign off sheets containing independent building control sign off of sheets.
- Building control sign off.

A copy of this report, redacted to remove signatures for staff and to remove and details specific to individual flats, is included as Appendix 5. In some cases redaction is to such an extent that forms have been removed.

4.9 Subsequent to the urgent works required for re-occupation, Fire Risk Assessments (FRAs) were carried out in early August 2017 by independent fire safety consultants (Frankham RMS). These FRAs concluded there was now a

“moderate to normal” risk to life from fire at the premises. Consequently, the council formulated a strategy for additional fire safety works to reduce the risks identified in these FRAs.

These works, which are substantially complete, include:

- New 60 minute fire doors to all flat entrances.
- Fire blankets issued to each flat.
- Enhanced work to the operation function of the AOVs.
- Enhanced compartmentation works to basement areas.
- Survey of and works to fire dampers within service ducts as required.
- Installation of additional smoke and heat detectors in dwellings.

4.10 Following the report by Frankham FRS the LFB had requested that the council obtain a fire engineer’s report to confirm that the steps they had taken met with the Government’s requirements as set out in their guidance notes to building owners. The council commissioned competent fire engineering consultants to produce a qualitative design review which sets out the proposed fire strategy, allowing for continued occupation of the tower blocks, whilst the defective cladding was removed and replaced with a compliant system.

4.11 At the time of preparing this review, the report, which is still in draft, concluded that, following the remedial measures to the compartmentation of the building, the installation of fire alarms and the waking watch (24 hour fire wardens) provision, a Council Fire Safety expert would be required to undertake a comprehensive Fire Risk Assessment on each block. When evidenced that all criteria is fulfilled, the “stay put” strategy as recommended by the LFB would be assessed as suitable. Once the cladding was fully removed the waking watch would be reviewed by the council.

4.12 The report did highlight one specific issue in relation to the stairs in the blocks and long-term ventilation arrangements, something which had been raised by the LFB following the initial inspection that led to the Enforcement Notices. Investigations are to be carried out in respect of the layout of the basement area adjacent to the vent and the council will work with building control experts to establish the long-term ventilation requirements.

4.13 Removal of the cladding system commenced in October 2017 and was completed on Blashford, Bray, Burnham and Dorney by the end of December and on Taplow on 26 January 2018. This has removed any possibility of fire associated with the cladding system. The intention of the council is to replace the cladding with a non-combustible system complying with latest regulation and guidance. Portable Appliance Testing (PAT) was carried out in August post re-occupation.

4.14 In summary, all of the works described above and in the supporting documents have been carried out in three broad phases:

- Phase 1 – door repairs, compartmentation, Automatic Opening Vent works, installation of additional smoke detectors and fire blankets in dwellings, PAT testing of white goods and cladding removal.
- Phase 2 – Installation of 60 minute fire resistant (FD60S) communal doors and front entrance doors.
- Phase 3 – Cladding replacement – In a Cabinet meeting on 24th January 2018 the council decided to install a new Solid Aluminium cladding system.

4.15 Subsequent to this, detailed work on the proposed new cladding system has found that the standard of workmanship within the existing curtain wall assembly is variable. The most significant observations relate to structural fixing irregularities, sill heights that do not meet the regulatory minimum guidance, failed hardware to window systems and the presence of non-regulatory material behind fixing brackets and spandrel panels. These issues could compromise the new system and therefore the Cabinet on 21st March 2017 agreed that the curtain wall and windows be replaced.

4.16 The specialist technical consultant to this review, Mr Alan McCarthy, concludes that:

“on the evidence available, the council appears to have responded appropriately and swiftly to the situation identified by the LFB...”

- *Urgent remedial works required for all blocks were completed, to the satisfaction of independent experts and LFB, 19 days after evacuation. Whilst these early works are functionally sound, it is recognised some may require aesthetic improvement.*
- *Further works continued after reoccupation to respond fully to the LFB Enforcement Notices and FRAs carried out in August 2017 such that Enforcement Notices were fully complied with by 8 October 2017 and formally signed off on 26 November 2017.*
- *Any potential fire risk associated with the ACM has been eliminated by its removal.*
- *Relevant external experts have been involved at various stages to provide verification, certification and overall compliance of the works being carried out providing good assurance.*
- *Throughout, the council has employed appropriate mitigations whilst work is being carried out”.*

Commentary on the completion of works and the residents' return

4.17 On 26th June 2017 the council had asked the LFB to provide a formal notice of the issues identified as part of the inspection that led to the evacuation, and some indication of the required tasks and priorities. This was not provided by the LFB until 12th July 2017 when the Enforcement Notices were issued. LFB has subsequently stated that the preparation of a notice in such circumstances, particularly for high rise buildings, is so complex that no earlier issue was possible.

4.18 It is difficult to understand why these notices were not given a higher priority by the LFB. This was the only estate in London which had been evacuated. If the LFB had sought to obtain an Article 31 Prohibition Notice they would have had to complete comprehensive paperwork immediately after the inspection (although the detail of the work to be undertaken does not have to be listed on the Prohibition Notice). The council was left until 12th July with nothing other than the handwritten note from the night of the evacuation, although the LFB were attending the blocks to provide verbal advice on the remedial works. The LFB process does not seem to take adequate account of the consequences of their actions for partner organisations, nor indeed for residents.

4.19 Following the re-occupation of the blocks the council's communications could have been better. Many residents expected more work to have been done while they were evacuated. They also did not all understand that there would still be significant disruption for months or possibly years to come. Media stories at the time were quite negative about the quality of the works and the council did not provide a full response to this. It was not made clear that this work was the functional minimum agreed by the LFB to allow people back into their homes, not the completion of the works. The council could have given a stronger message that their first priority was to reach a position where residents could return to their homes as quickly as possible.

5. Learning points

Evacuation

5.1 There should be absolute clarity for residents about the legal status of any evacuation and their rights in such circumstances.

5.2 The council should ensure that the LFB is aware of the issues and concerns identified in this review in respect of:

- Matters to be taken into account when advising evacuation.
- The need for timely documentation and support following any evacuation.

5.3 In any similar evacuation in the future the council should ensure early skilled assessment of the needs of individuals and families, so as to match them with suitable accommodation.

5.4 The council should ensure that the work of London Resilience with hotel chains, seeking to develop arrangements for securing hotel rooms outside of existing procurement processes, is informed by the events reviewed in this report.

Emergency planning

5.5 Emergency planning procedures should be kept under review to ensure that they are fit for purpose and recording processes have been refined.

5.6 Volunteers should be sought who will be trained in emergency planning with regular refresher training and exercises. Regular emergency exercises should also involve senior management.

5.7 Emergency planning credit cards should be provided to appropriate staff with spending levels adequate to fund a major emergency response.

5.8 Where the deployment of security staff is necessary the council should be mindful of the need to ensure that they are briefed and their conduct is appropriate.

5.9 In situations where there is a high media profile the council should consider ways of protecting people from media attention if they do not want it.

Good practice

5.10 There was strong leadership from officers and councillors. The Leader of the Council was accessible to residents and the media. There was unity across political parties in working to make the evacuation as well managed as possible.

5.11 There was great willingness from council staff to assist in responding to the emergency. Other councils were also very supportive through Mutual Aid.

5.12 Communications with residents after the initial weekend were effective, using a range of methods. This included the presence of staff in the blocks on an ongoing basis in order to answer questions face to face.

5.13 The council worked hard to establish and maintain an open and accessible relationship with the media.

5.14 The identification of vulnerable residents and provision of a dedicated team to work with them worked well. This was supported by the NHS by the presence of a local GP and two mental health trusts.

5.15 The Council used a range of independent assessors to validate the safety of the remedial work undertaken.

APPENDIX 1: Terms of reference

The evacuation of the Chalcots Estate – an independent review.

Terms of Reference

1. Introduction

1.1 On 23rd June 2017, the London Borough of Camden (“the Council”) began the evacuation of the four tower blocks which form the Chalcots Estate. Residents were encouraged and advised to return to the buildings on or around the 11th July 2017.

1.4 The Council has decided to review the evacuation of the Chalcots Estate. That review will consider the events and decisions that led to the evacuation, and the management of the evacuation itself, including the decision to invite residents to return. These are the Terms of Reference for that review.

2. Lines of Enquiry

2.1 The review will consider the following matters.

1. How and why was the decision taken to evacuate? What advice was that decision based on? Were there effective communications within and between agencies?

2. How did the Council and partners deal with the evacuation? Did residents receive the accommodation, financial and pastoral support they needed? Were communications with residents effective, at the point of evacuation and subsequently?

3. What remedial works were carried out before and after residents were invited to return? What was the “sign off” process for these works?

4. What was the process for deciding that residents could return to their homes?

5. How can this review of these events contribute to a national debate about fire safety and building regulation?

6. What recommendations can be made for how the Council operates in the future?

In addition, the Leader has invited questions from Residents and the review will attempt to answer these specific questions as part of its consideration of the above.

3. The process of the review

3.1 The Council has identified an independent person, Marian Harrington, to lead the review. Marian Harrington will be assisted by a small number of independent people with specialist knowledge and expertise, to include individuals with backgrounds and expertise in

- engineering or construction
- emergency management and risk assessment
- community engagement or liaison
- housing management

3.2 The project sponsor for the review is the Leader of Camden Council, Cllr Georgia Gould. The lead officer is Mr. Andrew Maughan, the Borough Solicitor. The Council will identify sufficient officer resource to support the work of the independent chair and the panel of advisors.

3.3 The review will

- Consider evidence gathered by the Council in advance of the commencement of the review
- Direct resources to the identification of further evidence as necessary
- Ensure that there is appropriate engagement with residents and other stakeholders
- Present a report on these matters to the Council in the Spring with the intention that it is then published.

3.4 The Council then wishes there to be a further review which will consider broader and more technical aspects of these matters including the original refurbishment of the blocks, the decisions as to the cladding system used and the management of the blocks between 2006 and 2017. It is expected that Marian Harrington and the independent advisors would remain available to assist the second phase of the review as necessary.

3.5 It is planned that engagement with residents is achieved through regular updates. There will be opportunities for residents to submit evidence by letter or email - the Council has set up a dedicated email address for the review – independent.review@camden.gov.uk , and focus groups may be held as deemed necessary by the independent person.

APPENDIX 2: The independent reviewers

Mrs Marian Harrington, Lead Reviewer

Marian Harrington has been a leader in the field of adult social care with a particular specialism in safeguarding adults. She was the Director of Adults Services in Westminster until 2011. She was Chair of the London branch of the Association of Directors of Adults Services and Chair of the London Joint Improvement Partnership with the NHS. While in Westminster she was responsible for the humanitarian response to a number of major incidents, working with central government on services to families affected by the 7/7 bombings .

Following her retirement from local government she led the Associates Network of the Association of Directors of Adults Services and was the independent chair of very successful Safeguarding Adults Boards for three London Boroughs including Camden. She has carried out reviews and independent scrutiny of adult safeguarding and emergency cover arrangements for a range of statutory agencies and private and voluntary organisations. She chaired the London Safeguarding Board Chairs Group until late 2016 and is therefore well connected with leaders in safeguarding adults across all London services.

Mr. Alan McCarthy, Technical Advisor

Alan McCarthy is a Chartered Civil Engineer who has spent almost 40 years in public service. He is a retired local authority Chief Executive and ex Director of Environment and Housing where his responsibilities included: building control, the management of safety at sports grounds and the management of the council's housing stock. At the same time he was a non-executive director of NHBC Building Control Services for six years.

Following retirement he embarked on a portfolio of non-executive roles. Included in his portfolio is being a Trustee for Brighton Dome and Festival, for which he is Chair of the Health and Safety Committee.

APPENDIX 3: Engagement plan

Aims of Engagement

Resident engagement, as part of the first phase of the Independent Review, was coordinated to give all stakeholders the opportunity to:

- Provide information about their knowledge experience of the evacuation to inform the Chair's findings.
- Ask questions to the Council about the evacuation that the Chair can seek to address or respond to in the report.

Key Audiences

For the purposes of engagement for the review, the Chair is not distinguishing between the four blocks that were evacuated (Burnham, Bray, Dorney, Taplow) and the one block which was not evacuated (Blashford).

Contributions include:

- **Camden Council Staff:** Interviews.
- **External Partners:** Interviews.
- **Councillors:** Interviews and written submissions.
- **Chalcots Estate Tenant and Resident Association (TRA):** Interviews and written submissions.
- **Chalcots Residents:** Online survey, email feedback and focus groups.
- **Voluntary Community Sector (VCS) organisations:** Meeting to feedback.

Methods of Engagement

The Chair facilitated the following engagement methods:

- One-to-one interviews between the Chair of the review and Chalcots Estate TRA representatives, Councillors, Camden Council Officers and external partners including the London Fire Brigade (LFB).
- A series of focus groups with Chalcots Estate residents. Chalcots Estate residents were invited to attend via a resident letter with information also provided in the Chalcots weekly newsletter.
- A VCS group meeting to gain feedback from involved local groups.
- A questionnaire for residents to complete, with an online and paper version available to all residents. Chalcots Estate residents were invited to contribute via a resident letter with information also provided in the Chalcots weekly newsletter. The paper survey was sent to all residents in the letter with a freepost return address.
- An open invitation for residents to contribute to the review through the allocated email address independent.review@camden.gov.uk

ENDS



23 June

Dear Resident,

Chalcots Estate – urgent fire safety works

I am writing to inform you that following a joint inspection of your block with the London Fire Brigade and Camden Council's technical experts we will be evacuating your block immediately.

Together we decided that your block needs to be temporarily vacated whilst we undertake additional fire safety works. Regretfully, this means that we need you to move from your home for between three and four weeks.

If you have friends or family who are you are able to stay with, this may be the best option. If you do not have anyone you can stay with, Camden Council will provide temporary accommodation for you at no cost.

I am absolutely determined to ensure that you are all safe. We will support you in all the ways that we are able to, keep you fully informed, and we will act swiftly, and be open and transparent. We expect that the necessary fire safety works will be completed within three to four weeks.

We realise that this is hugely distressing for everyone affected and we will be doing all we can, alongside the London Fire Brigade and other authorities, to support our residents at this difficult time.

The Grenfell fire changes everything. We are taking this action because the safety of our residents comes first. We are sorry for the disruption this will cause to your lives, but we will work as quickly as possible over the coming weeks to get you back into your homes.

Please go downstairs to your block's lobby where Camden Council staff will provide you will information, advice and support.

You will appreciate that this is an emerging incident and we will be providing regular updates. **Follow @camdentalking and [camden.gov.uk/news](https://www.camden.gov.uk/news)**

Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Georgia Gould".

Councillor Georgia Gould
Leader of the Council

APPENDIX 5: Compliance overview report

The report included on the following pages gives a detailed account of the steps taken by the council to comply with the Enforcement Notices. This *Compliance Overview Report for the LFB Enforcement Notices at Chalcots Estate* was commissioned by the council from Capital Property & Construction Consultants.

The report includes these documents:

- Enforcement Notices *Summary Compliance Documents*.
- Remedial Works Action, including detail on the remedial works.
- Specifications for the remedial works.
- Third Party sign off documentation for the specialist work, including remedial works and Automatic Operating Vents (AOV) commissioning reports.
- Completed sign off sheets containing independent building control sign off of sheets.
- Building control sign off.

This copy of the report has been redacted to remove signatures for staff and to remove details specific to individual flats. In order to include the *Compliance Overview Report* as an Appendix within the format of this *Independent Review*, some of the information will appear with very small lettering. The whole document will be made available online which will allow readers to zoom or enlarge any parts of the document as needed.

The numbering that appears at the bottom of the pages that follow this one, was formatted as part of the original *Compliance Overview Report*. To maintain integrity of the two documents, it has not been altered to make it continuous with the page numbering of the Independent Review.



Architecture | Surveying | Engineering | Project Management

**Compliance Overview
Report for the LFB
Enforcement Notice at
Chalcots Estate**

for

**London Borough of
Camden**

In relation to

Chalcots Estate

Prepared by

**Capital Property
& Construction
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
Project:-

Chalcots Estate
Fire Upgrade Works
In Response to
London Fire Brigade
Enforcement Notice

Prepared by:-

Patrick Madigan MRICS
29th November 2017
(Rev C – 14th May 2018)

This document has been prepared in accordance with our Quality Assurance procedures and authorised for release.



Signed

Name Patrick Madigan MRICS Director

For and on behalf of Capital Property & Construction Consultants Ltd.

Date 29th November 2017 (Rev C – 14th May 2018)

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

On Friday 23rd June 2017 the London Fire Brigade (LFB) undertook a site inspection to Bray, Burnham, Dorney, Taplow and Blashford Towers (also known as the Chalcots Estate tower blocks) to assess the fire integrity of the blocks, under the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005.

Following their site visit the LFB served Enforcement Notices on the London Borough of Camden (LBC) for each of the blocks. The Enforcement Notices were dated the 12th July 2017 and identified the areas of concern in relation to fire precaution works and the proposed remedial actions the LFB deemed necessary to remedy the contraventions found.

Upon receipt of the notices the LBC formed an operational team to set out the project roles, responsibilities, key actions, risks and deliverables, and formulated a communication plan to support delivery of the necessary works. The operational team met weekly in order to agree and review the approach, management responsibilities, progress in relation to the necessary works, cost control, risks and the management of third party and resident liaison and communications.

In order to record the actions taken to remedy the contraventions raised in the LFB Enforcement Notices a 'Summary Compliance Document' was produced for each of the blocks to record how compliance was managed, achieved & signed off (See Appendix A).

This report will set out the approach and the actions taken in respect of the Enforcement Notices and will include all of the supporting documentation to evidence how compliance, and independent third party sign off was achieved and the contraventions remedied and signed off by the London Fire Brigade.

2.0 COMPLIANCE SUMMARY DOCUMENTS

The 'Compliance Summary Documents' for each of the blocks is detailed within Appendix A. The purpose of these documents is to set out how each stage of the compliance requirements were recorded and addressed against the Enforcement Notice requirements, under the following headings:

- LFB Original Enforcement Notices – Areas of Concern / Contraventions
- LFB Recommendations to Remedy the Contraventions
- LBC Remedial Works Action
- LBC Remedial Works Specification

- LBC Remedial Works Commission Reports for AOV's Etc
- List of Remedial Works Contractors
- Third Party Sign Off - Euro Compliance Sign Off
- Building Control Sign Off
- LFB Sign Off
- Generic Photography's of the Remedial Works

The summary document sets out the areas of concern as raised by LFB, the proposed actions to remedy the contraventions, the remedial action taken by LBC and the sign off process from third parties, Building Control and from the LFB on completion of the works.

3.0 LONDON FIRE BRIGADE ENFORCEMENT NOTICE - AREAS OF CONCERN

The summary compliance documents, as detailed in Appendix A, sets out the areas of concern as communicated by the LFB in their Enforcement Notices. The typical contraventions discovered on site and detailed in the Enforcement Notices included the following:

- Existing Fire Risk Assessments (FRA) not suitable and sufficient for the premises
- Fire protective measures had not been planned, organized, controlled, monitored or reviewed where required
- Fire separation was found to be inadequate
- Absence of self-closures to flat entrance fire doors
- Large gaps above flat entrance door frames
- Service ducts in common parts had been boxed in with combustible material
- Maintenance of passive fire protection had not been planned or organised
- The use of service riser cupboards for storage had not been controlled
- Doors, glazing and panels did not provide 30 minute fire protection to access routes
- Missing or inadequate fire stopping to service penetrations
- Large amounts of combustible material used to box in services
- Access to the smoke ventilation system not adequately controlled
- Smoke ventilation system to communal staircase windows had been tampered with and was not operating correctly
- Lack of information for the firefighting service on override controls for Automatic Opening Vent's (AOV's)
- Fire stopping undertaken to an inadequate standard and no competent person employed to sign off work
- Rising main had not been tested within the last 12 months
- No information provided in relation to fire performance of vent to foot of stairs
- Maintenance of passive fire protection had not been planned or organised
- The use of electrical riser cupboards for storage had not been controlled
- Holes to ceilings and walls of basements

4.0 STEPS CONSIDERED NECESSARY TO REMEDY THE CONTRAVENTION

Within the Enforcement Notices the LFB identified the recommended, steps considered necessary to remedy the contraventions, under the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005. These included the following actions:

- A review of the Fire Risk Assessments with specific consideration given to the issues raised in the enforcement notice schedules and additional guidance
- Arrangements identified as not suitably addressed must be effectively planned, organised, controlled, monitored and reviewed
- Ensure access routes are acting as protected routes from fire including 60 minutes for compartmentation walls and 30 minutes for openings in walls including doors in entrance ways, service openings, borrowed light glazing, holes around cable trunking and pipework
- Ensure access corridors are returned to its intended state as a protected route to afford protection from fire in a flat to relevant persons who may require use of that corridor for safe escape from the premises in case of fire including ensure AOV's are operating correctly
- Arrange necessary contact with the appropriate external emergency services by providing clear and concise information about the smoke ventilation system to the communal staircases and landings
- Appoint one or more competent persons to provide you with safety assistance
- Arrange initial and on-going maintenance to ensure fire-fighting measures are kept in an efficient state, working order and good repair

The 'steps considered necessary to remedy the contraventions' highlighted in the Enforcement Notices where set out by the LFB as a guide to meet compliance and their recommendations formed the basis of the LBC's remedial works action plan and specification.

5.0 LONDON BOROUGH OF CAMDEN - REMEDIAL WORKS ACTION

The LBC remedial works action plan and specification followed the recommendations detailed within the steps considered necessary to remedy the contraventions and were developed with specialist input from LBC technical staff, LBC framework property consultants / Fire Engineer's, FRA survey and report consultant, external Building Control authorities, third party specialist fire proofing company, specialist competent M&E contractors and competent main contractors from LBC's approved list of contractors.

The remedial works actions included the following:

- Existing door closures adjusted or new closures fitted as appropriate to meet current building regulation requirements
- Gaps around doors and panels were sealed with intumescent smoke seals and intumescent fire mastic as appropriate, drop seals were fitted to the base of doors where required. Defective glazing was replaced as appropriate

- The mdf housing and its constituent timber framework were removed to ceilings and walls as appropriate. New Metsec steel framework was installed, this was further clad in a 1 hour fire rated material
- Appropriate maintenance work to passive fire protection was undertaken
- Materials stored within electrical riser cupboards were removed
- All service penetrations were sealed up using proprietary fire stopping material
- Tamper proof detector heads were fitted in the common parts, these were fitted using an allen key so that they cannot be twisted. The AOVs were independently tested by a specialist company and were correctly programmed and are independently activated. Ongoing maintenance works to the AOVs will be continuing as a matter of course in line with the service protocols. In the event of the system being triggered on a specific floor; by activation of the sensor owing to smoke, or the detector developing a fault, the relevant floor would be set to “fire” rendering the AOV’s on that floor open and the others within the block closed. In these instances the AOV master panel on the ground floor can be used to further activate other floors should there be the necessity. An auto-dialling facility was also set up on each AOV panel whereby any fault warnings on the panel trigger an alert to the Council’s 24 hour 7 day monitoring centre which will call out an AOV engineer to attend site within 4 hours. Instructions for the ventilation control panel will be housed within Premises Information Box
- O&M Manual are now available to provide details for how fire fighters can override the smoke ventilation system. Information is housed in the Premises Information Box within communal entrance lobbies
- Following the issue of the LFB Enforcement Notice the London Borough of Camden commissioned an up to date FRA survey and report & appointed a fire risk management consultant to advice on the upgrade works and the strategy for meeting the compliance requirements within the Enforcement Notice. London Borough of Camden also employed competent contractors to undertake the necessary upgrade works and these works were inspected and passed by both a Third Party Fire Proofing Specialist and independent Building Control Authorities
- Following the issue of the LFB Enforcement Notice the London Borough of Camden introduced a new maintenance regime to facilitate the maintenance of the fire-fighting measures. This includes testing of the dry riser main, AOV's on the staircases, emergency lighting at required intervals and in line with statutory regulations

In addition to the remedial works action measures, required to remedy the contraventions within the Enforcement Notices, LBC have also formulated a strategy for managing additional fire safety works arising from the updated Fire Risk Assessments to the blocks and for replacing the existing ACM cladding panels which failed the BRE test for combustible. The proposed additional fire safety works includes; new 60 minute fire doors to all flat entrance doors, fire blankets issued to each flat, enhanced works to the operation function of the AOV's, enhanced compartmentation works to basement areas, survey of and works to fire dampers within service ducts as required, installation of additional smoke and heat detectors in dwellings, survey of internal compartmentation and works as required, replacements of the external cladding panels, etc.

Although the above work is not part of the Enforcement Notice compliance, it is worth mentioning, in the context of this report, that some of the additional fire safety works outlined above is currently on site and will be on-going for the next year or so.

Appendix H shows the Fire Blanket & Front Entrance Door installation matrix for each of the properties per block.

6.0 REMEDIAL WORKS SPECIFICATION

The remedial works specification, as detailed within Appendix B, was developed and agreed by LBC technical staff, LBC framework property consultants / Fire Engineer and the Third Party Fire Proofing Specialist, in order to meet the specification requirements of the Enforcement Notices proposed remedial action.

The specification set out the material and installation requirements for all of the works including the fire door upgrade works, compartmentation works to ceilings and walls, works to address the AOV operational and management issues, fire compartmentation to pipework and service penetrations and all other associated works.

7.0 REMEDIAL WORKS COMMISSION REPORTS

The commissioning reports, as detailed within Appendix C, relate to the works associated with the Automatic Opening Vents, as undertaken by a specialist Mechanical & Electrical contractor (Openview) and the operation manuals and maintenance plans in respect of the AOV's, lighting, riser ducts and their future maintenance.

The live 'Summary Compliance Documents' also contain a link to the recent Fire Risk Assessments, undertaken in August 2017 for each of the blocks, and these updated FRA's were commissioned by LBC to ensure that the LBC met the Enforcement Notice requirements for suitable and sufficient FRA's to the blocks.

8.0 REMEDIAL WORKS CONTRACTORS

The framework contractors employed to carry out the remedial works were categorised as competent contractors in the context of undertaking fire precaution works.

The following contractors worked on the following blocks:

- Blashford Tower - Wates, Mulalley, Openview & GEM
- Bray Tower - Kier, Openview & GEM
- Burnham Tower - Wates, Mulalley, Openview & GEM
- Dorney Tower - Kier, Openview & GEM
- Taplow Tower - Kier, Openview & GEM

The works undertaken by Kier, Wates & Mulalley were independently signed off by an independent third party fire specialist company and two London Authority Building Control departments.

9.0 THIRD PARTY SIGN OFF

As part of the remedial works sign off process an independent Third Party Fire Proofing company in the form of 'Euro Compliance' were employed by LBC to inspect the works and sign off completion.

Appendix D details the on-site sign off and the validation letter issued by 'Euro Compliance' confirming the signatures of their on-site operatives who inspected and passed the completed works.

Third-party certification schemes for fire protection products and related services are an effective means of providing the fullest possible assurances, offering a level of quality, reliability and safety and therefore 'Euro Compliance's' involvement on the project has provided LBC with an impartial and independent specialist, to sign off the necessary remedial works as completed.

10.0 BUILDING CONTROL SIGN OFF

In addition to Euro Compliance's involvement on the project LBC also commissioned the London Borough of Lambeth & Westminster Building Control departments to undertake independent Building Regulation compliance inspections and sign off of the completed works on site.

Appendix E details the on-site sign off and the validation letters from each of the Building Control authorities confirming the signatures of their on-site operatives who inspected and passed the completed works.

11.0 LONDON FIRE BRIGADE SIGN OFF

The London Fire Brigade inspected the completed works on the 6th October 2017 and issued sign off letters for each of the blocks on the 16th November 2017, (See attached in Appendix F). The LFB sign off letters confirm that the works specified in the Enforcement Notices dated 12th July 2017 have been satisfactorily completed within the specified time limits.

Although LBC are still undertaking fire improvement works to the blocks this compliance overview report relates to the works identified in the Enforcement Notices as issued on the 12th July 2017 and their subsequent compliance and sign off by the LFB on the 16th November 2017.

12.0 GENERIC PHOTOGRAPHS DETAILING THE TYPICAL UPGRADE WORKS

The generic photography within Appendix G show typical examples of the original areas of concerns and the typical remedial works actions undertaken by LBC to the various elements to remedy the failings.

APPENDIX A

COMPLIANCE SUMMARY DOCUMENTS

BLASHFORD - REGULATORY REFORM (FIRE SAFETY) ORDER 2005 - ENFORCEMENT NOTICE COMPLIANCE DOCUMENT SUMMARY

| Article | London Fire Brigade Enforcement Notice - Areas of Concern | Steps Considered Necessary to Remedy the Contravention | London Borough of Camden Remedial Works Action | Specification Ref. | Commissioning Reports / AOV Information | Works Contractor | Euro Compliance Inspection / Sign Off | | | Building Control Inspection / Sign Off | | | London Fire Brigade Inspection / Sign Off | | | Generic Photos |
|--------------|--|--|--|--|---|--|---------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|---|------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| | | | | | | | Checks Y/N | Sign Off Sheet | Dates | Checks Y/N | Sign Off Sheet | Date | Checks Y/N | Sign Off / Cert | Date | |
| Article 9(1) | At the time of the audit the fire risk assessment for your premises was not suitable and sufficient. It was found that: 1) The absence of self-closers on flat front doors has not been identified. The fire risk assessment recommendation to upgrade doors within one year was not a suitable timescale. 2) Services in the common parts had been boxed in with combustible material (MDF). This had not been identified by the fire risk assessment. | The fire risk assessment should be reviewed, with specific consideration given to the items in this schedule and additional guidance provided. | Action: 1) Existing door closures adjusted or new closures fitted as appropriate to meet current requirements. New 60 minutes fire doors to be fitted over the next 2-3 months. 2) The mdf housing and its constituent timber framework were removed. New Metsec steel framework was installed, this was further clad in a 1 hour fire rated material. | 1.0 10.0 | N/A | Wates Wates Mufalley | Yes Yes | EC Sign Off EC Sign Off | 17/09/2017 to 21/07/2017 17/07/2017 to 21/07/2017 | Yes Yes | BC Sign Off BC Sign Off | 17/07/2017 to 19/07/2017 17/07/2017 to 19/07/2017 | Yes | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos |
| Article 11 | At the time of the audit your preventative and protective measures had not been planned, organized, controlled, monitored or reviewed where required. It was found that: 1) Maintenance of passive fire protection had not been planned or organized. 2) The use of service riser cupboards for storage had not been controlled. | Arrangements identified as not suitably addressed must be effectively planned, organized, controlled, monitored or reviewed. | Action: 1) Maintenance work to passive fire protection has now been undertaken as part of compliance with LFB Notice 2) Materials stored within electrical riser cupboards have now been removed | Note Note | N/A | N/A | N/A N/A | N/A N/A | N/A N/A | N/A N/A | N/A N/A | Yes | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos | |
| Article 17 | The corridors, lobbies and stairs used for access to and from flats in the premises (the access routes) are intended for use by relevant persons as a PROTECTED ROUTE. This route should provide a safe means of escape in event of fire and must be maintained in an efficient state, in efficient working order and good repair. During audit it was found that the responsible person for management of the access route has not prevented or addressed deficiencies in the fire resistance of the PROTECTED ROUTE and/or required rectification of defects that have arisen in, and/or alterations made to, the protection of the access route. The PROTECTED ROUTE has been compromised by: 1) Doors do not provide 30 minutes fire protection to the access route. 2) Missing or inadequate fire stopping for service penetrations between the common corridors, service risers, and flats. 3) Large amounts of combustible materials used to box in services. | Ensure the access corridor is returned to its intended state as a PROTECTED ROUTE to afford protection from fire in a flat to relevant persons who may require use of that corridor for safe escape from the premises in case of fire. Remedial work that may be necessary for this purpose, must be assessed and completed by a competent person who is practised in application of the relevant standards for means of escape. Your attention is drawn to the provisions of subsections (2) (3) and (4) of Article 17 of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 in the attached extracts of legislation. You are advised that walls in PROTECTED ROUTES should have a minimum of 60 minutes fire resistance. Openings in the walls leading to accommodation off a PROTECTED ROUTE (including doors in entrance ways, service openings, borrowed light glazing, holes around cables trunking and pipework) should be of a minimum 30 minutes fire resistance. Available means the responsible person could use to comply with Article 17 (1) may include enforcing terms of lease and Landlord and Tenant / Property legislation as lessor/owner. | Action: 1) Existing door closures adjusted or new closures fitted as appropriate Gaps around doors and panels sealed with intumescent smoke seals and intumescent fire mastic as appropriate, drop seals have been fitted to the base of doors where required. Defective glazing has been replaced as appropriate. New FD30 doors fitted where existing doors not suitable for repair/upgrade. 2) All service penetrations sealed up using proprietary fire stopping material 3) The mdf housing and its constituent timber framework were removed. New Metsec steel framework was installed, this was further clad in a 1 hour fire rated material | 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 10.0 | N/A | Wates Wates Wates Mufalley | Yes | EC Sign Off | 17/07/2017 to 21/07/2017 | Yes | BC Sign Off | 17/07/2017 to 19/07/2017 | Yes | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos |
| Article 17 | The corridors, lobbies and stairs used for access to and from flats in the premises (the access routes) are intended for use by relevant persons as a PROTECTED ROUTE. This route should provide a safe means of escape in event of fire and must be maintained in an efficient state, in efficient working order and good repair. During audit it was found that the responsible person for management of the access route has not prevented or addressed deficiencies in the ventilation of the PROTECTED ROUTE and/or required rectification of defects that have arisen in, and/or alterations made to the ventilation of the access route. The PROTECTED ROUTE has been compromised by the configuration of the smoke ventilation system. At the time of audit, confirmation was not provided that the system remains operable in the event of a local detector fault. | Ensure the access corridor is returned to its intended state as a PROTECTED ROUTE to afford protection from fire in a flat to relevant persons who may require use of that corridor for safe escape from the premises in case of fire. Remedial work that may be necessary for this purpose must be assessed and completed by a competent person who is practised in application of the relevant standards for means of escape. The following is provided as advice and does not form any part of the notice: Your attention is drawn to the provisions of subsections (2) (3) and (4) of Article 17 of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 in the attached extracts of legislation. Available means the responsible person could use to comply with Article 17 (1) may include enforcing terms of lease and Landlord and Tenant / Property legislation as lessor/owner. | Tamper proof detector heads have been fitted in the common parts, these have been fitted using an allen key so that they cannot be twisted. The AOVs have been independently tested by a specialist company and are correctly programmed and are independently activated. Ongoing maintenance works to the AOVs will be continuing as a matter of course in line with the service protocols. In the event of the system being triggered on a specific floor; by activation of the sensor owing to smoke or the detector developing a fault, the relevant floor would be set to "fire" rendering the AOVs on that floor open and the others within the block closed. In these instances the AOV master panel on the ground floor can be used to further activate other floors should there be the necessity. An auto-dialling facility has also been set up on each AOV panel whereby any fault warnings on the panel trigger an alert to the Council's 24 hour Day monitoring centre which will call out an AOV engineer to attend site within 4 hours. Instructions for the ventilation control panel will be housed within Premises Information Box. | See AOV Commissioning Report | AOV - Inspection Report | Operview | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | Yes | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos |
| Article 13 | At the time of the audit you had not made the necessary arrangements with external emergency services. It was found that there was no information regarding the fire fighter override controls for the smoke ventilation system. | Arrange necessary contact with the appropriate external emergency services by providing clear and concise information about the smoke ventilation system. | Action: 1) O&M Manual will provide details for how fire fighters can override the smoke ventilation system. Information will be housed in the Premises Information Box. | Management Action LBC | OPV User Guide | LBC Staff | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | Yes | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos |
| Article 18 | At the time of the audit you had not appointed any competent persons to assist you in undertaking your identified preventive and protective measures. It was found that fire stopping had been carried out to an inadequate standard. | Appoint one or more competent persons to provide you with safety assistance. This can be achieved by appointing staff or contractors competent in installing fire stopping, and providing suitable oversight to ensure standards are met. | Action: Following the issue of the LFB Enforcement Notice the London Borough of Camden commissioned an up to date FRA survey and report & appointed a fire risk management consultant to advise on the upgrade works and the strategy for meeting the compliance requirements within the Enforcement Notice. London Borough of Camden also employed competent contractors to undertake the necessary upgrade works and these works were inspected and passed by both the fire risk management consultant and independent Building Control Authorities | Note | FRA - August 2017 | Frankham RMS Euro Compliance Wates Mufalley | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | Yes | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos |
| Article 38 | At the time of the audit a suitable system of maintenance - of the fire-fighting measures was not in place. At the time of audit, confirmation was not provided that the rising main had been tested in the previous twelve months. | Arrange initial and on-going maintenance to ensure fire-fighting measures are kept in an efficient state, working order and good repair. This can be achieved by ensuring a suitable testing and maintenance regime is in place for facilities provided for fire fighters. | Action: Following the issue of the LFB Enforcement Notice the London Borough of Camden has introduced a maintenance regime to facilitate the maintenance of the fire-fighting measures. This will include testing of the dry riser main, AOV's on the staircases, emergency lighting at required intervals and in line with statutory regulations | Management Action LBC | LBC Maintenance Plan | LBC Staff | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | Yes | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos |

BRAY - REGULATORY REFORM (FIRE SAFETY) ORDER 2005 - ENFORCEMENT NOTICE COMPLIANCE DOCUMENT SUMMARY

| Article | London Fire Brigade Enforcement Notice - Areas of Concern | Steps Considered Necessary to Remedy the Contravention | London Borough of Camden Remedial Works Action | Specification Ref. | Commissioning Reports / AOV Information | Works Contractor | Euro Compliance Inspection / Sign Off | | | Building Control Inspection / Sign Off | | | London Fire Brigade Inspection / Sign Off | | | Generic Photos |
|--------------|---|--|--|---|---|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|---|------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| | | | | | | | Checks Y/N | Sign Off Sheet | Dates | Checks Y/N | Sign Off Sheet | Date | Checks Y/N | Sign Off / Cert | Date | |
| Article 9(1) | At the time of the audit the fire risk assessment (FRA) for your premises was not suitable and sufficient. It was found that: 1) The large gaps above flat front door frames have not been identified. 2) No information was included regarding the vent at the foot of the stair (i.e. from where it draws its air, and any fire protection measures are in place or required). | The fire risk assessment should be reviewed, with specific consideration given to the items in this Schedule and additional guidance provided. | Action: 1) Gaps around doors and panels sealed with intumescent smoke seals and intumescent fire mastic as appropriate, drop seals have been fitted to the base of doors where required 2) The vent terminals within the blocks have been boarded over with fire board and sealed pending further investigation / action | 1.0 2.0 8.0 | N/A | Kier Kier | Yes Yes | EC Sign Off EC Sign Off | 13/07/2017 to 21/07/2017 13/07/2017 to 21/07/2017 | Yes Yes | BC Sign Off BC Sign Off | 13/07/2017 to 21/07/2017 13/07/2017 to 21/07/2017 | Yes | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos |
| Article 11 | At the time of the audit your and protective measures had not been planned, organized, controlled, monitored or reviewed where required. It was found that: 1) Maintenance of passive fire protection had not been planned or organised. 2) Access to the smoke ventilation system had not been adequately controlled. It was found that residents were tampering with detector heads, causing the system to go into fault. This prevents the correct vents from opening in the event of a fire on a different floor. 3) The use of electrical riser cupboards for storage had not been controlled. | Arrangements identified as not suitably addressed must be effectively planned, organized, controlled, monitored or reviewed. | Action: 1) Maintenance work to passive fire protection has now been undertaken as part of compliance with LFB Notice 2) Tamper proof detector heads have been fitted in the common parts, these have been fitted using an allen key so that they cannot be twisted. The AOVs have been independently tested by a specialist company and are correctly programmed and are independently activated. Ongoing maintenance works to the AOVs will be continuing as a matter of course in line with the service protocols. In the event of the system being triggered on a specific floor, by activation of the sensor owing to smoke, or by a faulty component, the relevant floor would be set to "fire" rendering the AOV's on that floor open and the others within the block closed. In these instances the AOV master panel on the ground floor can be used to further activate other floors should there be the necessity. Instructions for the ventilation control panel will be housed within Premises Information Box. 3) Materials stored within electrical riser cupboards have now been removed | Note See AOV Inspection Report Note | AOV - Inspection Report | Openview | N/A N/A | N/A N/A | N/A N/A | N/A N/A | N/A N/A | Yes? | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos | |
| Article 17 | The corridors, lobbies and stairs used for access to and from flats in the premises (the access route(s)) are intended for use by relevant persons as a PROTECTED ROUTE. This route should provide a safe means of escape in event of fire and must be maintained in an efficient state, in efficient working order and good repair. During audit it was found that the responsible person for management of the access route has not prevented or addressed deficiencies in the fire resistance of the PROTECTED ROUTE and/or required rectification of defects that have arisen in, and/or made to, the protection to the access route. The PROTECTED ROUTE has been compromised by: 1) Doors, glazing and panels that do not provide 30 minutes fire protection to the access route. 2) Missing or inadequate fire for service penetrations between the common corridors, service risers, and flats | Ensure the access corridor is returned to its intended state as a PROTECTED ROUTE to afford protection from fire in a flat to relevant persons who may require use of that corridor for safe escape from the premises in case of fire. Remedial work that may be necessary for this purpose must be assessed and completed by a competent person who is practised in application of the relevant standards for means of escape. Your attention is drawn to the provisions of subsections (2) (3) and (4) of Article 17 of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 in the attached extracts of legislation. You are advised that walls in PROTECTED ROUTES should have a minimum of 60 minutes fire resistance. Openings in the walls leading to accommodation off a PROTECTED ROUTE (including doors in entrance ways, service openings, borrowed light glazing, holes around cables trunking and pipework) should be of a minimum 30 minutes fire resistance. Available means the responsible person could use to comply with Article 17 (1) may include enforcing terms of lease and Landlord and Tenant / Property legislation as lessor/owner. | Action: 1) Existing door closures adjusted or new closures fitted as appropriate. Gaps around doors and panels sealed with intumescent smoke seals and intumescent fire mastic as appropriate, drop seals have been fitted to the base of doors where required. Defective glazing has been replaced as appropriate. New FD30 doors fitted where existing doors not suitable for repair/upgrade. 2) All service penetrations sealed up using proprietary fire stopping material | 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 | N/A | Kier Kier Kier Kier | Yes | EC Sign Off | 13/07/2017 to 21/07/2017 | Yes | BC Sign Off | 13/07/2017 to 21/07/2017 | Yes? | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos |
| Article 17 | The corridors, lobbies and stairs used for access to and from flats in the premises (the access routes) are intended for use by relevant persons as a PROTECTED ROUTE. This route should provide a safe means of escape in event of fire and must be maintained in an efficient state, in efficient working order and good repair. During audit it was found that the responsible person for management of the access route has not prevented or addressed deficiencies in the ventilation of the PROTECTED ROUTE and/or required rectification of defects that have arisen in, and/or alterations made to the ventilation of the access route. The PROTECTED ROUTE has been compromised by the configuration of the smoke ventilation system. A detector fault on a single floor renders the entire system inoperable. | Ensure the access corridor is returned to its intended state as a PROTECTED ROUTE to afford protection from fire in a flat to relevant persons who may require use of that corridor for safe escape from the premises in case of fire. Remedial work that may be necessary for this purpose must be assessed and completed by a competent person who is practised in application of the relevant standards for means of escape. The following is provided as advice and does not form any part of the notice: Your attention is drawn to the provisions of subsections (2) (3) and (4) of Article 17 of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 in the attached extracts of legislation. Available means the responsible person could use to comply with Article 17 (1) may include enforcing terms of lease and Landlord and Tenant / Property legislation as lessor / owner. | Action: Tamper proof detector heads have been fitted in the common parts, these have been fitted using an allen key so that they cannot be twisted. The AOVs have been independently tested by a specialist company and are correctly programmed and are independently activated. Ongoing maintenance works to the AOVs will be continuing as a matter of course in line with the service protocols. In the event of the system being triggered on a specific floor, by activation of the sensor owing to smoke, or the detector developing a fault, the relevant floor would be set to "fire" rendering the AOV's on that floor open and the others within the block closed. In these instances the AOV master panel on the ground floor can be used to further activate other floors should there be the necessity. An auto-dialling facility has also been set up on each AOV panel whereby any fault warnings on the panel trigger an alert to the Council's 24 hour 7 day monitoring centre which will call out an AOV engineer to attend site within 4 hours. Instructions for the ventilation control panel will be housed within Premises Information Box. | See AOV Commissioning Report | AOV - Inspection Report | Openview | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | Yes? | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos |
| Article 8 | At the time of the audit the FIRE RESISTING separation in your premises was inadequate. It was found that: 1) There were visible holes in the ceilings and walls of the basement car park and plant rooms. 2) Service penetrations in the basement were not adequately fire stopped. | Provide suitable FIRE RESISTING separation by: 1) Repairing any holes in the ceiling and walls to provide 60 minutes fire separation. 2) Installing suitable fire stopping around service penetrations. | Action: 1) Verticals holes in basement have been repaired with 60 minute fire separation materials as appropriate 2) All vertical service penetrations have been sealed using proprietary fire stopping material | 9.0 3.0 4.0 | N/A | Kier | Yes | EC Sign Off | 13/07/2017 to 21/07/2018 | Yes | BC Sign Off | 13/07/2017 to 21/07/2018 | Yes? | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos |
| Article 13 | At the time of the audit you had not made the necessary arrangements external emergency services. It was found that there was no information regarding the fire fighter override controls for the smoke ventilation system. | Arrange necessary contact with the appropriate external emergency services by providing clear and concise information about the smoke ventilation system. | Action: 1) O&M Manual will provide details for how fire fighters can override the smoke ventilation system. Information will be housed in the Premises Information Box. | Management Action LBC | OPV User Guide | LBC Staff | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | Yes? | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos |
| Article 18 | At the time of the audit you had not appointed any competent person(s) to assist you in undertaking your identified preventive and protective measures. It was found that fire stopping had been carried out to an inadequate standard. | Appoint one or more competent persons to provide you with safety assistance. This can be achieved by appointing staff or contractors competent in installing fire stopping, and providing suitable oversight to ensure standards are met. | Action: Following the issue of the LFB Enforcement Notice the London Borough of Camden have introduced a maintenance regime to advise on the upgrade works and the strategy for meeting the compliance requirements within the Enforcement Notice. London Borough of Camden also employed competent contractors to undertake the necessary upgrade works and these works were inspected and passed by both the fire risk management consultant and independent Building Control Authorities | Note | FRA - August 2017 | Frankham RMS Euro Compliance Kier | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | Yes? | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos |
| Article 38 | At the time of the audit a suitable system of maintenance of the fire-fighting measures was not in place. At the time of audit, confirmation was not provided that the rising main had been tested in the previous twelve months. | Arrange initial and on-going maintenance to ensure fire-fighting measures are kept in an efficient state, working order and good repair. This can be achieved by ensuring a suitable testing and maintenance regime is in place for facilities provided for fire fighters. | Action: Following the issue of the LFB Enforcement Notice the London Borough of Camden have introduced a maintenance regime to facilitate the maintenance of the fire-fighting measures. This will include testing of the dry riser main, AOV's on the staircases, emergency lighting at required intervals and in line with statutory regulations | Management Action LBC | LBC Maintenance Plan | LBC Staff | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | Yes? | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos |

BURNHAM - REGULATORY REFORM (FIRE SAFETY) ORDER 2005 - ENFORCEMENT NOTICE SUMMARY COMPLIANCE DOCUMENT

| Article | London Fire Brigade Enforcement Notice - Areas of Concern | Steps Considered Necessary to Remedy the Contravention | London Borough of Camden Remedial Works Action | Specification Ref. | Commissioning Reports / AOV Information | Works Contractor | Euro Compliance Inspection / Sign Off | | | Building Control Inspection / Sign Off | | | London Fire Brigade Inspection / Sign Off | | | Generic Photos |
|--------------|--|---|--|---|--|--|---------------------------------------|----------------------------|--|--|----------------------------|--|---|------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------|
| | | | | | | | Checks Y/N | Sign Off Sheet | Dates | Checks Y/N | Sign Off Sheet | Date | Checks Y/N | Sign Off / Cert | Date | |
| Article 9(1) | At the time of the audit, the fire risk assessment (FRA) for your premises was not suitable and sufficient. It was found that: 1) The absence of self-closers on flat front doors has not been identified. The FRA recommendation to upgrade a minimum of strips and seals / fire rated letterbox was not sufficient. 2) The absence of strips and seals on the stair and lobby fire doors has not been identified. 3) The large gaps above flat front door frames have not been identified. 4) No information was included regarding the vent at the foot of the stair (i.e. from where it draws its air, and if any fire protection measures are in place or required) | The fire risk assessment should be reviewed, with specific consideration given to the items in this Schedule and additional guidance provided. | Action: 1) Existing door closures adjusted or new closures fitted as appropriate 2) & 3) Gaps around doors and panels sealed with intumescent smoke seals and intumescent fire mastic as appropriate, drop seals have been fitted to the base of doors where required 4) The vent terminals within the blocks have been boarded over with fire board and sealed pending further investigation / action | 1.0 2.0 3.0 8.0 | N/A | Wates Wates Mulailey | Yes Yes | EC Sign Off EC Sign Off | 11/07/2017 to 21/07/2017 11/07/2017 to 21/07/2017 | Yes Yes | BC Sign Off BC Sign Off | 11/07/2017 to 19/07/2017 11/07/2017 to 19/07/2017 | Yes | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos |
| Article 11 | At the time of the audit your preventative and protective measures had not been planned, organised, controlled monitored or reviewed where required. It was found that: 1) Maintenance of passive fire protection had not been planned or organised. 2) Access to the smoke ventilation system had not been adequately controlled. It was found that residents were tampering with detector heads, causing the system to go into fault. This prevents the correct vents from opening in the event of a fire on a different floor. 3) The use of electrical riser cupboards for storage had not been controlled. | Arrangements identified as not suitably addressed must be effectively planned, organized, controlled, monitored or reviewed | Action: 1) Maintenance work to passive fire protection has now been undertaken as part of compliance with LFB Notice 2) Tamper proof detector heads have been fitted in the common parts, these have been fitted using an allen key so that they cannot be twisted. The AOVs have been independently tested by a specialist company and are correctly programmed and are independently activated. Ongoing maintenance works to the AOVs will be continuing as a matter of course in line with the service protocols. In the event of the system being triggered on a specific floor, by activation of the sensor owing to smoke, by a faulty component, the relevant floor would be set to "fire" rendering the AOV's on that floor open and the others within the block closed. In these instances the AOV master panel on the ground floor can be used to further activate other floors should there be the necessity. Instructions for the ventilation control panel will be housed within Premises Information Box. 3) Materials stored within electrical riser cupboards have now been removed | Note See AOV Inspection Report Note | AOV - Inspection Report | Openview | N/A N/A | N/A N/A | N/A N/A | N/A N/A | N/A N/A | Yes | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos | |
| Article 17 | The corridors, lobbies and stairs used for access to and from flats in the premises (the access route(s)) are intended for use by relevant persons as a PROTECTED ROUTE. This route should provide a safe means of escape in event of fire and must be maintained in an efficient state, in efficient working order and good repair. During audit it was found that the responsible person for management of the access route has not prevented or addressed deficiencies in the fire resistance of the PROTECTED ROUTE and/or required rectification of defects that have arisen in, and/or made to, the protection to the access route. The PROTECTED ROUTE has been compromised by: 1) Doors, glazing and panels that do not provide 30 minutes fire protection to the access route. 2) Missing or inadequate fire for service penetrations between the common corridors, service risers, and flats. | Ensure the access corridor is returned to its intended state as a PROTECTED ROUTE to afford protection from fire in a flat to relevant persons who may require use of that corridor for safe escape from the premises in case of fire. Remedial work that may be necessary for this purpose must be assessed and completed by a competent person who is practising in application of the relevant standards for means of escape. Your attention is drawn to the provisions of subsections (2) (3) and (4) of Article 17 of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 in the attached extracts of legislation. You are advised that walls in PROTECTED ROUTES should have a minimum of 60 minutes fire resistance. Openings in the walls leading to accommodation off a PROTECTED ROUTE (including doors in entrance ways, service openings, borrowed light glazing, holes around cables trunking and pipework) should be of a minimum 30 minutes fire resistance. Available means the responsible person could use to comply with Article 17 (1) may include enforcing terms of lease and Landlord and Tenant / Property legislation as lessor/owner. | Action: 1) Existing door closures adjusted or new closures fitted as appropriate. Gaps around doors and panels sealed with intumescent smoke seals and intumescent fire mastic as appropriate, drop seals have been fitted to the base of doors where required. Defective glazing has been replaced as appropriate. New FD30 doors fitted where existing doors not suitable for repair/upgrade. 2) All service penetrations sealed up using proprietary fire stopping material | 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 | N/A | Wates Wates Mulailey | Yes | EC Sign Off | 11/07/2017 to 21/07/2017 | Yes | BC Sign Off | 11/07/2017 to 19/07/2017 | Yes | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos |
| Article 17 | The corridors, lobbies and stairs used for access to and from flats in the premises (the access route(s)) are intended for use by relevant persons as a PROTECTED ROUTE. This route should provide a safe means of escape in event of fire and must be maintained in an efficient state, in efficient working order and good repair. During audit it was found that the responsible person for management of the access route has not prevented or addressed deficiencies in the ventilation of the PROTECTED ROUTE and/or required rectification of defects that have arisen in, and/or alterations made to the ventilation of the access route. The PROTECTED ROUTE has been compromised by the configuration of the smoke ventilation system. A detector fault on a single floor renders the entire system inoperable. | Ensure the access corridor is returned to its intended state as a PROTECTED ROUTE to afford protection from fire in a flat to relevant persons who may require use of that corridor for safe escape from the premises in case of fire. Remedial work that may be necessary for this purpose must be assessed and completed by a competent person who is practising in application of the relevant standards for means of escape. The following is provided as advice and does not form any part of the notice: Your attention is drawn to the provisions of subsections (2) (3) and (4) of Article 17 of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 in the attached extracts of legislation. Available means the responsible person could use to comply with Article 17 (1) may include enforcing terms of lease and Landlord and Tenant / Property legislation as lessor / owner. | Action: Tamper proof detector heads have been fitted in the common parts, these have been fitted using an allen key so that they cannot be twisted. The AOVs have been independently tested by a specialist company and are correctly programmed and are independently activated. Ongoing maintenance works to the AOVs will be continuing as a matter of course in line with the service protocols. In the event of the system being triggered on a specific floor, by activation of the sensor owing to smoke, the detector developing a fault, the relevant floor would be set to "fire" rendering the AOV's on that floor open and the others within the block closed. In these instances the AOV master panel on the ground floor can be used to further activate other floors should there be the necessity. An auto-dialling facility has also been set up on each AOV panel whereby a fault warnings on the panel trigger an alert to the Council's 24 hour 7 day monitoring centre which will call out an AOV engineer to attend site within 4 hours. Instructions for the ventilation control panel will be housed within Premises Information Box. | See AOV Commissioning Report | AOV - Inspection Report | Openview | N/A N/A | N/A N/A | N/A N/A | N/A N/A | N/A N/A | Yes | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos | |
| Article 8 | At the time of the audit the FIRE RESISTING separation in your premises was inadequate. It was found that: 1) There were visible holes in the ceilings and walls of the basement car park and plant rooms. 2) Service penetrations in the basement were not adequately fire stopped. | Provide suitable FIRE RESISTING separation by: 1) Repairing any holes in the ceiling and walls to provide 60 minutes fire separation. 2) Installing suitable fire stopping around service penetrations. | Action: 1) Verticals holes to ceilings in basement have been repaired with 60 minute fire separation materials as appropriate 2) All vertical service penetrations have been sealed using proprietary fire stopping material | 9.0 3.0 4.0 | N/A | Wates Mulailey | Yes | EC Sign Off | 11/07/2017 to 21/07/2017 | Yes | BC Sign Off | 11/07/2017 to 19/07/2017 | Yes | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos |
| Article 8 | At the time of the audit general fire precautions as identified in the significant items findings of the assessment had not been implemented. It was found that the following risk critical actions had not been completed in the recorded timescale: 1) Fire stopping above riser doors 2) Upgrades to flat front doors At the time of the audit, confirmation was not provided that the following risk critical actions had been completed: 1) Compartmentation survey of internal stacks. 2) Testing and maintenance of the automatic opening vents, emergency lighting and dry rising main. | Implement the significant findings of your fire risk assessment, in particular the outstanding risk critical items identified in your fire risk assessment dated 13 April 2016, taking into account the findings of the review of that risk assessment. | Action: 1) Fire board fitted and compartment maintained above the riser doors 2) Existing door closures adjusted or new closures fitted as appropriate. Gaps around doors and panels sealed with intumescent smoke seals and intumescent fire mastic as appropriate, drop seals have been fitted to the base of doors where required. Defective glazing has been replaced as appropriate. New FD30 doors fitted where existing doors not suitable for repair/upgrade. 1) SVP and vertical risers have been surveyed by an independent consultant. SE ducts. It has been recommended that whilst initial surveys were into void properties, further access to occupied archetypes in addition to a CCTV survey should be cross referenced on the SE ducts identifying any live appliances in leaseholder flats in addition to any breaches on the precast concrete sections. This is currently in progress 2) The automatic opening vents, emergency lighting and dry rising main are programmed for relevant testing at required intervals in line with statutory regulations | 4.0 1.0 2.0 | Management Action LBC Management Action LBC | Wates Wates LBC Staff | Yes N/A | EC Sign Off N/A | 11/07/2017 to 21/07/2017 N/A | Yes N/A | BC Sign Off N/A | 11/07/2017 to 19/07/2017 N/A | Yes Yes | LFB Sign Off LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos |
| Article 13 | At the time of the audit you had not made the necessary arrangements external emergency services. It was found that there was no information regarding the fire fighter override controls for the smoke ventilation system. | Arrange necessary contact with the appropriate external emergency services by providing clear and concise information about the smoke ventilation system. | Action: 1) O&M Manual will provide details for how fire fighters can override the smoke ventilation system. Information will be housed in the Premises Information Box. | Management Action LBC | OPV User Guide | LBC Staff | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | Yes | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos |
| Article 18 | At the time of the audit you had not appointed any competent person(s) to assist you in undertaking your identified preventive and protective measures. It was found that fire stopping had been carried out to an inadequate standard. | Appoint one or more competent persons to provide you with safety assistance. This can be achieved by appointing staff or contractors competent in installing fire stopping, and providing suitable oversight to ensure standards are met. | Action: Following the issue of the LFB Enforcement Notice the London Borough of Camden commissioned an up to date FRA survey and report & appointed a fire risk management consultant to advise on the upgrade works and the strategy for meeting the compliance requirements within the Enforcement Notice. London Borough of Camden also employed competent contractors to undertake the necessary upgrade works and these works were inspected and passed by both the fire risk management consultant and independent Building Control Authorities | Note | FRA - August 2017 | Frankham RMS Euro Compliance Wates Mulailey | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | Yes | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos |
| Article 38 | At the time of the audit a suitable system of maintenance of the fire-fighting measures was not in place. The 2016 Fire Risk Assessment indicated the dry rising main had not been subjected to an annual test. At the time of the audit, confirmation was not provided that the rising main had been tested in the previous twelve months. | Arrange initial and on-going maintenance to ensure fire-fighting measures are kept in an efficient state, working order and good repair. This can be achieved by ensuring a suitable testing and maintenance regime is in place for facilities provided for fire fighters. | Action: Following the issue of the LFB Enforcement Notice the London Borough of Camden have introduced a maintenance regime to facilitate the maintenance of the fire-fighting measures. This will include testing of the dry riser main, AOV's on the staircases, emergency lighting at required intervals and in line with statutory regulations | Management Action LBC | LBC Maintenance Plan | LBC Staff | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | Yes | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos |

DORNEY - REGULATORY REFORM (FIRE SAFETY) ORDER 2005 - ENFORCEMENT NOTICE COMPLIANCE DOCUMENT SUMMARY

| Article | London Fire Brigade Enforcement Notice - Areas of Concern | Steps Considered Necessary to Remedy the Contravention | London Borough of Camden Remedial Works Action | Specification Ref. | Commissioning Reports / AOV Information | Works Contractor | Euro Compliance Inspection / Sign Off | | | Building Control Inspection / Sign Off | | | London Fire Brigade Inspection / Sign Off | | | Generic Photos |
|--------------|--|--|---|---|---|---|---------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|---|------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| | | | | | | | Checks Y/N | Sign Off Sheet | Dates | Checks Y/N | Sign Off Sheet | Date | Checks Y/N | Sign Off / Cert | Date | |
| Article 9(1) | At the time of the audit the fire risk assessment (FRA) for your premises was not suitable and sufficient. It was found that: 1) The large gaps above flat front door frames have not been identified. 2) No information was included regarding the vent at the foot of the stair (i.e. from where it draws its air, and if any fire protection measures are in place or required) | The fire risk assessment should be reviewed, with specific consideration given to the items in this Schedule and additional guidance provided. | Action: 1) Gaps around doors and panels sealed with intumescent smoke seals and intumescent fire mastic as appropriate, drop seals have been fitted to the base of doors where required 2) The vent terminals within the blocks have been boarded over with fire board and sealed pending further investigation / action | 1.0 2.0 8.0 | N/A | Kier Kier | Yes Yes | EC Sign Off EC Sign Off | 13/07/2017 to 19/07/2017 13/07/2017 to 19/07/2017 | Yes Yes | BC Sign Off BC Sign Off | 13/07/2017 to 21/07/2017 13/07/2017 to 21/07/2017 | Yes | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos |
| Article 11 | At the time of the audit your preventative and protective measures had not been planned, organised, controlled monitored or reviewed where required. It was found that: 1) Maintenance of passive fire protection had not been planned or organised. 2) Access to the smoke ventilation system had not been adequately controlled. It was found that residents were tampering with detector heads, causing the system to go into fault. This prevents the correct vents from opening in the event of a fire on a different floor. 3) The use of electrical riser cupboards for storage had not been controlled. | Arrangements identified as not suitably addressed must be effectively planned, organized, controlled, monitored or reviewed | Action: 1) Maintenance work to passive fire protection has now been undertaken as part of compliance with LFB Notice 2) Tamper proof detector heads have been fitted in the common parts, these have been fitted using an allen key so that they cannot be twisted. The AOV's have been independently tested by a specialist company and are correctly programmed and are independently activated. Ongoing maintenance works to the AOV's will be continuing as a matter of course in line with the service protocols. In the event of the system being triggered on a specific floor; by activation of the sensor owing to smoke, or by a faulty component, the relevant floor would be set to "fire" rendering the AOV's on that floor open and the others within the block closed. In these instances the AOV master panel on the ground floor can be used to further activate other floors should there be the necessity. Instructions for the ventilation control panel will be housed within Premises Information Box. 3) Materials stored within electrical riser cupboards have now been removed | Note See AOV Inspection Report Note | AOV - Inspection Report | Openview | N/A N/A | N/A N/A | N/A N/A | N/A N/A | N/A N/A | Yes | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos | |
| Article 17 | The corridors, lobbies and stairs used for access to and from flats in the premises (the access route(s) are intended for use by relevant persons as a PROTECTED ROUTE. This route should provide a safe means of escape in event of fire and must be maintained in an efficient state, in efficient working order and good repair. During audit it was found that the responsible person for management of the access route has not prevented or addressed deficiencies in the fire resistance of the PROTECTED ROUTE and/or required rectification of defects that have arisen in, and/or made to, the protection to the access route. The PROTECTED ROUTE has been compromised by: 1) Doors, glazing and panels that do not provide 30 minutes fire protection to the access route. 2) Missing or inadequate fire for service penetrations between the common corridors, service risers, and flats | Ensure the access corridor is returned to its intended state as a PROTECTED ROUTE to afford protection from fire in a flat to relevant persons who may require use of that corridor for safe escape from the premises in case of fire. Remedial work that may be necessary for this purpose must be assessed and completed by a competent person who is practised in application of the relevant standards for means of escape. Your attention is drawn to the provisions of subsections (2) (3) and (4) of Article 17 of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 in the attached extracts of legislation. You are advised that walls in PROTECTED ROUTES should have a minimum of 60 minutes fire resistance. Openings in the walls leading to accommodation off a PROTECTED ROUTE (including doors in entrance ways, service openings, borrowed light glazing, holes around cables trunking and pipework) should be of a minimum 30 minutes fire resistance. Available means the responsible person could use to comply with Article 17 (1) may include enforcing terms of lease and Landlord and Tenant / Property legislation as lessor/owner. | Action: 1) Existing door closures adjusted or new closures fitted as appropriate. Gaps around doors and panels sealed with intumescent smoke seals and intumescent fire mastic as appropriate, drop seals have been fitted to the base of doors where required. Defective glazing has been replaced as appropriate. New FD30 doors fitted where existing doors not suitable for repair/upgrade. 2) All service penetrations sealed up using proprietary fire stopping material | 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 | N/A | Kier Kier Kier | Yes | EC Sign Off | 13/07/2017 to 19/07/2017 | Yes | BC Sign Off | 13/07/2017 to 21/07/2017 | Yes | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos |
| Article 17 | The corridors, lobbies and stairs used for access to and from flats in the premises (the access route(s) are intended for use by relevant persons as a PROTECTED ROUTE. This route should provide a safe means of escape in event of fire and must be maintained in an efficient state, in efficient working order and good repair. During audit it was found that the responsible person for management of the access route has not prevented or addressed deficiencies in the ventilation of the PROTECTED ROUTE and/or required rectification of defects that have arisen in, and/or alterations made to the ventilation of the access route. The PROTECTED ROUTE has been compromised by the configuration of the smoke ventilation system. A detector fault on a single floor renders the entire system inoperable. | Ensure the access corridor is returned to its intended state as a PROTECTED ROUTE to afford protection from fire in a flat to relevant persons who may require use of that corridor for safe escape from the premises in case of fire. Remedial work that may be necessary for this purpose must be assessed and completed by a competent person who is practised in application of the relevant standards for means of escape. The following is provided as advice and does not form any part of the notice: Your attention is drawn to the provisions of subsections (2) (3) and (4) of Article 17 of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 in the attached extracts of legislation. Available means the responsible person could use to comply with Article 17 (1) may include enforcing terms of lease and Landlord and Tenant / Property legislation as lessor / owner. | Action: 1) Existing door closures adjusted or new closures fitted as appropriate. Gaps around doors and panels sealed with intumescent smoke seals and intumescent fire mastic as appropriate, drop seals have been fitted to the base of doors where required. Defective glazing has been replaced as appropriate. New FD30 doors fitted where existing doors not suitable for repair/upgrade. 2) All service penetrations sealed up using proprietary fire stopping material | See AOV Commissioning Report | AOV - Inspection Report | Openview | N/A N/A | N/A N/A | N/A N/A | N/A N/A | N/A N/A | Yes | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos | |
| Article 8 | At the time of the audit the FIRE RESISTING separation in your premises was inadequate. It was found that: 1) There were visible holes in the ceilings and walls of the basement car park and plant rooms. 2) Service penetrations in the basement were not adequately fire stopped. | Provide suitable FIRE RESISTING separation by: 1) Repairing any holes in the ceiling and walls to provide 60 minutes fire separation. 2) Installing suitable fire stopping around service penetrations | Action: 1) Verticals holes to ceilings in basement have been repaired with 60 minute fire separation materials as appropriate 2) All vertical service penetrations have been sealed up using proprietary fire stopping material | 9.0 3.0 4.0 | N/A | Kier | Yes | EC Sign Off | 13/07/2017 to 19/07/2017 | Yes | BC Sign Off | 13/07/2017 to 21/07/2017 | Yes | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos |
| Article 8 | At the time of the audit general fire precautions as identified in the significant items findings of the assessment had not been implemented. It was found that the following risk critical actions had not been completed in the recorded timescale: 1) Fire stopping above riser doors 2) Upgrades to flat front doors 3) Intrusive surveys to determine compartmentation between flats and service panels. At the time of audit, confirmation was not provided that the following risk critical actions had been completed: 4) Compartmentation survey of internal stacks. 5) Testing and maintenance of the automatic opening vents, emergency lighting and dry rising main. | Implement the significant findings of your fire risk assessment. In particular the outstanding risk critical items identified in your fire risk assessment dated 15 January 2016, taking into account the findings of the review of that risk assessment. | Action: 1) Fire board fitted and compartment maintained above the riser doors 2) Existing door closures adjusted or new closures fitted as appropriate. Gaps around doors and panels sealed with intumescent smoke seals and intumescent fire mastic as appropriate, drop seals have been fitted to the base of doors where required. Defective glazing has been replaced as appropriate. New FD30 doors fitted where existing doors not suitable for repair/upgrade. 1) SVP and vertical risers have been surveyed by an independent consultant. SE Ducts: It has been recommended that whilst initial surveys were into void properties, further access to occupied archetypes in addition to a CCTV survey should be cross referenced to the SE ducts identifying any live appliances in leaseholder flats in addition to any breaches on the precast concrete sections. This is currently in progress. 2) The automatic opening vents, emergency lighting and dry rising main are programmed for relevant testing at required intervals in line with statutory regulations | 4.0 1.0 2.0 | N/A | Kier Kier Kier | Yes | EC Sign Off | 13/07/2017 to 19/07/2017 | Yes | BC Sign Off | 13/07/2017 to 21/07/2017 | Yes | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos |
| Article 13 | At the time of the audit you had not made the necessary arrangements external emergency services. It was found that there was no information regarding the fire fighter override controls for the smoke ventilation system. | Arrange necessary contact with the appropriate external emergency services by providing clear and concise information about the smoke ventilation system. | Action: 1) OAM Manual will provide details for how fire fighters can override the smoke ventilation system. Information will be housed in the Premises Information Box. | Management Action LBC | OPV User Guide | LBC Staff | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | Yes | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos |
| Article 18 | At the time of the audit you had not appointed any competent person(s) to assist you in undertaking your identified preventive and protective measures. It was found that fire stopping had been carried out to an inadequate standard. | Appoint one or more competent persons to provide you with safety assistance. This can be achieved by appointing staff or contractors competent in installing fire stopping, and providing suitable oversight to ensure standards are met. | Action: Following the issue of the LFB Enforcement Notice the London Borough of Camden commissioned an up to date FRA survey and report & appointed a fire risk management consultant to advise on the upgrade works and the strategy for meeting the compliance requirements within the Enforcement Notice. London Borough of Camden also employed competent contractors to undertake the necessary upgrade works and these works were inspected and passed by both the fire risk management consultant and independent Building Control Authorities | Note | FRA - August 2017 | Frankham RMS Euro Compliance Kier | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | Yes | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos |
| Article 38 | At the time of the audit a suitable system of maintenance of the fire-fighting measures was not in place. At the time of audit, confirmation was not provided that the rising main had been tested in the previous twelve months. | Arrange initial and on-going maintenance to ensure fire-fighting measures are kept in an efficient state, working order and good repair. This can be achieved by ensuring a suitable testing and maintenance regime is in place for facilities provided for fire fighters. | Action: Following the issue of the LFB Enforcement Notice the London Borough of Camden have introduced a maintenance regime to facilitate the maintenance of the fire-fighting measures. This will include testing of the dry riser main, AOV's on the staircases, emergency lighting at required intervals and in line with statutory regulations | Management Action LBC | LBC Maintenance Plan | LBC Staff | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | Yes | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos |

TAPLOW - REGULATORY REFORM (FIRE SAFETY) ORDER 2005 - ENFORCEMENT NOTICE COMPLIANCE DOCUMENT SUMMARY

| Article | London Fire Brigade Enforcement Notice - Areas of Concern | Steps Considered Necessary to Remedy the Contravention | London Borough of Camden Remedial Works Action | Specification Ref. | Commissioning Reports / AOV Information | Works Contractor | Euro Compliance Inspection / Sign Off | | | Building Control Inspection / Sign Off | | | London Fire Brigade Inspection / Sign Off | | | Generic Photos |
|------------|--|--|---|---|---|---|---------------------------------------|----------------|--------------------------|--|----------------|--------------------------|---|-----------------|------------|----------------|
| | | | | | | | Checks Y/N | Sign Off Sheet | Dates | Checks Y/N | Sign Off Sheet | Date | Checks Y/N | Sign Off / Cert | Date | |
| Article 9 | At the time of the audit the fire risk assessment (FRA) for your premises was not suitable and sufficient. It was found that: 1) The absence of self-closers on flat front doors has not been identified. The FRA recommendation to upgrade to a minimum of strips and seals/fire rated letterbox was not sufficient. 2) The absence of strips and seals on the stair and lobby fire doors has not been identified. 3) The large gaps above flat front door frames have not been identified. 4) No information was included regarding the vent at the foot of the stair (i.e. from where it draws its air, and if any fire protection measures are in place or required). | The fire risk assessment should be reviewed, with specific consideration given to the items in this schedule and additional guidance provided. | Action: 1) Existing door closures adjusted or new closures fitted as appropriate 2) & 3) Gaps around doors and panels sealed with intumescent smoke seals and intumescent fire mastic as appropriate, drop seals have been fitted to the base of doors where required 4) The vent terminals within the blocks have been boarded over with fire board and sealed pending further investigation / action | 1.0 2.0 3.0 8.0 | N/A | Kier Kier Kier | Yes | EC Sign Off | 18/07/2017 to 24/07/2017 | Yes | BC Sign Off | 18/07/2017 to 24/07/2017 | Yes | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos |
| Article 11 | At the time of the audit your preventative and protective measures had not been planned, organized, controlled monitored or reviewed where required. It was found that: 1) Maintenance of passive fire protection had not been planned or organised. 2) Access to the smoke ventilation system had not been adequately controlled. It was found that residents were tampering with detector heads, causing the system to go into fault. This prevents the correct vents from opening in the event of a fire on a different floor. 3) The use of electrical riser cupboards for storage had not been controlled. 4) Repairs to the Premises Information Box had not been planned or organised. | Arrangements identified as not suitably addressed must be effectively planned, organised, controlled, monitored or reviewed. | Action: 1) Maintenance work to passive fire protection has now been undertaken as part of compliance with LFB Notice 2) Tamper proof detector heads have been fitted in the common parts, these have been fitted using an allen key so that they cannot be twisted The AOV's have been independently tested by a specialist company and are correctly programmed and are independently activated. Ongoing maintenance works to the AOV's will be continuing as a matter of course in line with the service protocols. In the event of the system being triggered on a specific floor, by activation of the sensor owing to smoke or by a faulty component, the relevant floor would be set to "fire" rendering the AOV's on that floor open and the others within the block closed. In these instances the AOV master panel on the ground floor can be used to further activate other floors should there be the necessity. Instructions for the ventilation control panel will be housed within Premises Information Box. 3) Materials stored within electrical riser cupboards have now been removed 4) The Premises Information Box has been repaired and relevant information such as AOV O&M, keys to AOV room and panel, general floor layout, vulnerable tenants list, etc, included in the on site box | Note See AOV Inspection Report Note Note | AOV - Inspection Report | Openview | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | Yes | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos |
| Article 17 | The corridors, lobbies and stairs used for access to and from flats in the premises (the access route(s)) are intended for use by relevant persons as a PROTECTED ROUTE. This route should provide a safe means of escape in event of fire and must be maintained in an efficient state, in efficient working order and good repair. During audit it was found that the responsible person for management of the access route has not prevented or addressed deficiencies in the fire resistance of the PROTECTED ROUTE and/or required rectification of defects that have arisen in, and/or alterations made to, the protection to the access route. The PROTECTED ROUTE has been compromised by: The corridors, lobbies and stairs used for access to and from flats in the premises (the access route(s)) are intended for use by relevant persons as a PROTECTED ROUTE. This route should provide a safe means of escape in event of fire and must be maintained in an efficient state, in efficient working order and good repair. During audit it was found that the responsible person for management of the access route has not prevented or addressed deficiencies in the fire resistance of the PROTECTED ROUTE and/or required rectification of defects that have arisen in, and/or alterations made to, the protection to the access route. The PROTECTED ROUTE has been compromised by: 1) Doors, glazing and panels that do not provide 30 minutes fire protection to the access route. 2) Missing or inadequate fire stopping for service penetrations between the common corridors, service risers, and flats. | Ensure the access corridor is returned to its intended state as a PROTECTED ROUTE to afford protection from fire in a flat to relevant persons who may require use of that corridor for safe escape from the premises in case of fire. Remedial work that may be necessary for this purpose, must be assessed and completed by a competent person who is practised in application of the relevant standards for means of escape. Your attention is drawn to the provisions of subsections (2) (3) and (4) of Article 17 of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 in the attached extracts of legislation. You are advised that walls in PROTECTED ROUTES should have a minimum of 60 minutes fire resistance. Openings in the walls leading to accommodation of a PROTECTED ROUTE (including doors in entrance ways, service openings, borrowed light glazing, holes around cables trunking and pipework) should be of a minimum 30 minutes fire resistance. Available means the responsible person could use to comply with Article 17 (1) may include enforcing terms of lease and Landlord and Tenant / Property legislation as lessor/owner | Action: 1) Existing door closures adjusted or new closures fitted as appropriate 2) Gaps around doors and panels sealed with intumescent smoke seals and intumescent fire mastic as appropriate, drop seals have been fitted to the base of doors where required. Defective glazing has been replaced as appropriate. New FD30 doors fitted where existing doors not suitable for repair/upgrade. 2) All service penetrations sealed up using proprietary fire stopping material | 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 | N/A | Kier Kier | Yes | EC Sign Off | 18/07/2017 to 24/07/2017 | Yes | BC Sign Off | 18/07/2017 to 24/07/2017 | Yes | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos |
| Article 17 | The corridors, lobbies and stairs used for access to and from flats in the premises (the access route(s)) are intended for use by relevant persons as a PROTECTED ROUTE. This route should provide a safe means of escape in event of fire and must be maintained in an efficient state, in efficient working order and good repair. During audit it was found that the person responsible for management of the access route has not prevented or addressed deficiencies in the ventilation of the PROTECTED ROUTE and/or required rectification of defects that have arisen in, and/or alterations made to, the protection to the access route. The PROTECTED ROUTE has been compromised by: A detector fault on a single floor renders the entire system inoperable. | Ensure the access corridor is returned to its intended state as a PROTECTED ROUTE to afford protection from fire in a flat to relevant persons who may require use of that corridor for safe escape from the premises in case of fire. Remedial work that may be necessary for this purpose, must be assessed and completed by a person who is practised in application of the relevant standards for means of escape. The following is provided as advice and does not form any part of the notice: Your attention is drawn to the provisions of subsections (2) (3) and (4) of Article 17 of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 in the attached extracts of legislation. Available means the responsible person could use to comply with Article 17 (1) may include enforcing terms of lease and Landlord and Tenant / Property legislation as lessor / owner. | Action: Tamper proof detector heads have been fitted in the common parts, these have been fitted using an allen key so that they cannot be twisted The AOV's have been independently tested by a specialist company and are correctly programmed and are independently activated. Ongoing maintenance works to the AOV's will be continuing as a matter of course in line with the service protocols. In the event of the system being triggered on a specific floor, by activation of the sensor owing to smoke, or the detector developing a fault, the relevant floor would be set to "fire" rendering the AOV's on that floor open and the others within the block closed. In these instances the AOV master panel on the ground floor can be used to further activate other floors should there be the necessity. An auto-dialling facility has also been set up on each AOV panel whereby any fault warnings on the panel trigger an alert to the Council's 24 hour 7 day monitoring centre which will call out an AOV engineer to attend site within 4 hours. Instructions for the ventilation control panel will be housed within Premises Information Box. | See AOV Inspection Report | AOV - Inspection Report | Openview | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | Yes | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos |
| Article 8 | At the time of the audit the FIRE RESISTING separation in your premises was inadequate. It was found that: 1) There were visible holes in the ceilings and walls of the basement car park and plant rooms. 2) Service penetrations in the basement were not adequately fire stopped. | Provide suitable FIRE RESISTING separation by: 1) Repairing any holes in the ceiling and walls to provide 60 minutes fire separation. 2) Installing suitable fire stopping around service penetrations. | Action: 1) Vertical holes to ceilings in basement have been repaired with 60 minute fire separation materials as appropriate 2) All vertical service penetrations have been sealed using proprietary fire stopping material | 9.0 3.0 4.0 | N/A | Kier | Yes | EC Sign Off | 18/07/2017 to 24/07/2017 | Yes | BC Sign Off | 18/07/2017 to 24/07/2017 | Yes | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos |
| Article 8 | At the time of the audit the general fire precautions as identified in the significant findings of your fire risk assessment had not been implemented. It was found that the following risk critical actions had not been completed in the recorded timescale: 1) Fire stopping above riser doors. 2) Upgrades to flat front doors. At the time of the audit confirmation was not provided that the following risk critical actions have been completed: 3) Compartmental survey of internal stacks. 4) Testing and maintenance of the automatic opening vents, emergency lighting and dry rising main. | Implement the significant findings of your fire risk assessment, in particular the outstanding risk critical items identified in your Fire Risk Assessment dated 13 April 2016, taking into account the findings of the review of that risk assessment. | Action: 1) Fire board fitted and compartment maintained above the riser doors 2) Existing door closures adjusted or new closures fitted as appropriate Gaps around doors and panels sealed with intumescent smoke seals and intumescent fire mastic as appropriate, drop seals have been fitted to the base of doors where required. Defective glazing has been replaced as appropriate. New FD30 doors fitted where existing doors not suitable for repair/upgrade. 1) SVF and vertical risers have been surveyed by an independent consultant. SE Ducts. It has been recommended that whilst initial surveys were into void properties, further access to occupied archetypes in addition to a CCTV survey should be cross referenced on the SE ducts identifying any live appliances in leaseholder flats in addition to any breaches on the precast concrete sections. This is currently in progress. 2) The automatic opening vents, emergency lighting and dry rising main are programmed for relevant testing at required intervals in line with statutory regulations. | 4.0 1.0 2.0 | N/A | Kier Kier | Yes | EC Sign Off | 18/07/2017 to 24/07/2017 | Yes | BC Sign Off | 18/07/2017 to 24/07/2017 | Yes | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos |
| Article 13 | At the time of the audit you had not made the necessary arrangements with external emergency services. It was found that: 1) The Premises Information Box was damaged and therefore unusable by emergency crews 2) There was no information regarding the fire fighter override controls for the smoke ventilation system. | Arrange necessary contact with the appropriate external emergency services by: 1) Repairing or replacing the Premises Information Box, and ensuring it includes the information specified in our guidance note 70. 2) Providing clear and concise information about the smoke ventilation system. | Action: 1) The Premises Information Box has been repaired and relevant information such as AOV O&M, keys to AOV room and panel, general floor layout, vulnerable tenants list, etc, included in the on site box 2) O&M Manual will provide details for how fire fighters can override the smoke ventilation system. Information will be housed in the Premises Information Box. | Note Note | PIP User Guide | LBC Staff | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | Yes | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos |
| Article 18 | At the time of the audit you had not appointed any competent person(s) to assist you in undertaking your identified preventative and protective measures. It was found that fire stopping had been carried out to an inadequate standard using unsuitable materials. | Appoint one or more competent persons to provide you with safety assistance. This can be achieved by appointing staff or contractors competent in installing fire stopping, and providing suitable oversight to ensure standards are met. | Action: Following the issue of the LFB Enforcement Notice the London Borough of Camden commissioned an up to date FRA survey and report & appointed a fire risk management consultant to advise on the upgrade works and the strategy for meeting the compliance requirements within the Enforcement Notice. London Borough of Camden also employed competent contractors to undertake the necessary upgrade works and these works were inspected and passed by both the fire risk management consultant and independent Building Control Authorities | Note | FRA - August 2017 | Frankham RMS Euro Compliance Kier | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | Yes | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos |
| Article 38 | At the time of the audit a suitable system of maintenance of the fire-fighting measures was not in place. The 2016 Fire Risk Assessment indicated the dry rising main had not been subject to an annual test. At the time of audit, confirmation was not provided that the rising main had been tested in the previous twelve months. | Arrange initial and on-going maintenance to ensure fire-fighting measures are kept in an efficient state, working order and good repair. This can be achieved by ensuring a suitable testing and maintenance regime is in place for facilities provided for fire fighters. | Action: Following the issue of the LFB Enforcement Notice the London Borough of Camden have introduced a maintenance regime to facilitate the maintenance of the fire-fighting measures. This will include testing of the dry riser main, AOV's on the staircases, emergency lighting at required intervals and in line with statutory regulations | Management Action LBC | LBC Maintenance Plan | LBC Staff | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | Yes | LFB Sign Off | 16/11/2017 | Typical Photos |

APPENDIX B

REMEDIAL WORKS SPECIFICATION

| FIRE REMEDIAL WORKS SPECIFICATION | | | | | |
|---|-------------|--|------------|------|------|
| General Note: | | NB - FIRE RATED FOAM SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED / USED | | | |
| | | Ensure operatives have approved RAMs and are signed up to these. Areas must be adequately protected and be kept tidy at all times. Fire exit routes to be maintained at all times. | | | |
| WORKS REQUIRED | Ref. | COMMUNAL WORKS | SIGN OFF | | |
| 1.0 Doors to stairwell | 1.0 | Doors should have gap of no more than 3mm with self closures, intumescent and smoke seals in addition to sealed panels above | Checks Y/N | Sign | Date |
| | | Outline works - (as many are considered to exceed 3mm tolerance) | | | |
| | 1.1 | Assess door to check gaps, whether door is warped etc. | | | |
| | 1.2 | If splits are easily remedied splice as necessary | | | |
| | 1.3 | Lip door where necessary to reduce gaps | | | |
| | 1.4 | Fit Batwing seals to doors OR Rout out doors and fit intumescent / smoke seals | | | |
| | 1.5 | If necessary face fix gasket to frame on closing edge | | | |
| | 1.6 | Ensure hinges are working in good order | | | |
| | 1.7 | Ensure that door closure is in good working order, replace where necessary | | | |
| | 1.8 | Where door closure is pressed against the wall on opening, fit horseshoe door stop to avoid damage to closure/door | | | |
| | 1.9 | Check integrity of panel above door | | | |
| | 1.10 | Ensure gaps to panel above doors is sealed with proprietary intumescent fire mastic | | | |
| | 1.11 | NB If doors are unsuitable for upgrade/repair owing to damage etc. replace with FD30s blanks to meet above spec | | | |
| 2.0 Intermediate Doors Leading to Different Communal Areas <i>(doors to stairwell are a priority over intermediate doors)</i> | 2.0 | As per above (although panels above are generally not in existence) | Checks Y/N | Sign | Date |
| | | Works - Door Adjacent to Lift | | | |
| | 2.1 | Assess door to check gaps, whether door is warped etc. | | | |
| | 2.2 | If splits are easily remedied splice as necessary | | | |
| | 2.3 | Lip door where necessary to reduce gaps | | | |
| | 2.4 | Fit Batwing seals to doors OR Rout out doors and fit intumescent / smoke seals | | | |
| | 2.5 | If necessary face fix gasket to frame on closing edge | | | |
| | 2.6 | Ensure hinges are working in good order | | | |
| | 2.7 | Ensure that door closure is in good working order, replace where necessary | | | |
| | 2.8 | Where door closure is pressed against the wall on opening, fit horseshoe door stop to avoid damage to closure/door | | | |
| | 2.9 | Check integrity of panel above door | | | |
| | 2.10 | Ensure gaps to panel above doors is sealed with proprietary intumescent fire mastic | | | |
| | 2.11 | NB If doors are unsuitable for upgrade/repair owing to damage etc. replace with FD30s blanks to meet above spec | | | |
| | | Door to rear of lift lobby | | | |
| | 2.12 | Assess door to check gaps, whether door is warped etc. | | | |
| | 2.13 | If splits are easily remedied splice as necessary | | | |
| | 2.14 | Lip door where necessary to reduce gaps | | | |
| | 2.15 | Fit Batwing seals to doors OR Rout out doors and fit intumescent / smoke seals | | | |
| | 2.16 | If necessary face fix gasket to frame on closing edge | | | |
| | 2.17 | Ensure hinges are working in good order | | | |
| | 2.18 | Ensure that door closure is in good working order, replace where necessary | | | |
| | 2.19 | Where door closure is pressed against the wall on opening, fit horseshoe door stop to avoid damage to closure/door | | | |
| | 2.20 | Check integrity of panel above door | | | |
| | 2.21 | Ensure gaps to panel above doors is sealed with proprietary intumescent fire mastic | | | |
| | 2.22 | NB If doors are unsuitable for upgrade/repair owing to damage etc. replace with FD30s blanks to meet above spec | | | |
| | | Rear door to stairwell lobby | | | |
| | 2.23 | Assess door to check gaps, whether door is warped etc. | | | |
| | 2.24 | If splits are easily remedied splice as necessary | | | |
| | 2.25 | Lip door where necessary to reduce gaps | | | |
| | 2.26 | Fit Batwing seals to doors OR Rout out doors and fit intumescent / smoke seals | | | |
| | 2.27 | If necessary face fix gasket to frame on closing edge | | | |
| | 2.28 | Ensure hinges are working in good order | | | |
| | 2.29 | Ensure that door closure is in good working order, replace where necessary | | | |
| | 2.30 | Where door closure is pressed against the wall on opening, fit horseshoe door stop to avoid damage to closure/door | | | |
| | 2.31 | Check integrity of panel above door | | | |
| | 2.32 | Ensure gaps to panel above doors is sealed with proprietary intumescent fire mastic | | | |
| | 2.33 | NB If doors are unsuitable for upgrade/repair owing to damage etc. replace with FD30s blanks to meet above spec | | | |
| 3.0 Riser Cupboards | 3.0 | | Checks Y/N | Sign | Date |
| | 3.1 | The riser cupboards are compartments within themselves and therefore we need to ensure separation from the communal areas and the gas compartment (duct below ceiling) - this is multifaceted requiring the riser doors to meet compliance, in addition to the gas duct being extended to the panel above the riser doors. | | | |
| | 3.2 | Penetrations must be adequately closed up using proprietary fire stopping materials. | | | |
| | 3.3 | In most cases the intumescent seals to the doors have been painted, renew the intumescent seal throughout and then check integrity as per the stairwell doors. Self closures not being required - rather an active lock. | | | |
| | 3.4 | A fire board will need face fixing to above the riser doors; the lower side level with the gas ventilation duct in the lobby - this will remove the requirement to notch the continuation of the gas duct - from the duct to above the riser doors. This must be mechanically secured and sealed with intumescent mastic. | | | |
| | 3.5 | Battens will require securing in the void between the gas duct and the risers to facilitate the continuation of the duct (by means of 60min fire board) which is to be sealed with proprietary intumescent/fire mastic. | | | |
| 4.0 Gas service duct /compartment | 4.0 | | Checks Y/N | Sign | Date |
| | 4.1 | The duct in the ceiling to the communal areas houses the gas supplies to the various flats. This has access hatches along its length in addition to venting above the communal windows | | | |
| | 4.2 | The duct requires extending to close the void toward the centre of the central stair core in line with the recommendation set out above for the riser cupboards | | | |
| | 4.3 | Any smoke / PIR detectors need to be examined to ensure that any voids are sealed with proprietary intumescent/fire mastic | | | |
| | 4.4 | Ditto any penetrations to the duct | | | |
| | 4.5 | Check there are no vents into the lobby space | | | |
| | 4.6 | The access panels require intumescent strips fitting to the 3 sides of the aperture when open with the high side having mastic to any penetrations. | | | |
| | 4.7 | Where gas pipes exit the duct into properties or above/below - any penetrations need to be adequately sealed. | | | |
| | 4.8 | Where the duct passes over an "intermediate" communal door the duct should be closed and any penetrations filled with proprietary intumescent mastic. Remedy as necessary. | | | |
| 5.0 Communal windows | 5.0 | | Checks Y/N | Sign | Date |
| | 5.1 | The communal windows have a vent to the outside above them (not visible internally) - it appears in places that the gas duct comes short and a upvc trim has been used to bridge this void. Additionally the side and base upvc trims are unsuitable as compartment stops. | | | |
| | 5.2 | Aluminium railings require careful removal and setting aside for refixing after works | | | |
| | 5.3 | Where AOV controls are in close approximation there needs to be close liaison with electricians and M&E managers to ensure the AOVs are not compromised and are maintained and replaced in working order | | | |
| | 5.4 | The upvc trim requires removing | | | |
| | 5.5 | Fit 15mm Kemwell FP-900 Fire Rated Non-Combustible Calcium Silicate Board to the head of the window onto the gas duct & from the window cill (100mm lap) to the window frame. Ensure this is mechanically fixed and bedded/ sealed on intumescent | | | |
| | 5.6 | Fit rockwall fire bats to the reveals | | | |
| | 5.7 | Finish window | | | |
| 6.0 Front Entrance Doors | 6.0 | | Checks Y/N | Sign | Date |
| | 6.1 | FED's for leaseholders may have asbestos in the panel above. Security grills must be removed and stored securely. UPVC doors must be removed and replaced | | | |
| | 6.2 | Check integrity of door - ensuring that this was previously a fire door and that the door or frame is not UPVC. | | | |
| | 6.3 | Fit Batwing seals, closure and gasket where required as per the stairwell doors | | | |
| | 6.4 | If the door / frame is severely compromised a standard FD30S blank should be sourced and replaced in line with current standards | | | |
| | 6.5 | Ensure 3 fire rated hinges are fitted - (with intumescent pads fitted behind hinges) | | | |
| | 6.6 | Penetrations from the gas duct through to the panel above the door must be sealed with proprietary intumescent/fire mastic. Owing to the accessibility this may best be done by lowering the access panel in the gas duct and doing so from inside | | | |
| | 6.7 | The panel above the door must be fire rated. Fit a new panel face fixed over the existing panel from frame from directly above the door all the way to the ceiling. The panel should cover the width of the frame, should be bedded and sealed in intumescent mastic and should be mechanically fixed on the lower edge. | | | |
| | 6.8 | A door closure must be fitted and adjusted to ensure compliance | | | |
| | 6.9 | Gas and any other penetrations must be sealed with fire mastic | | | |
| | 6.10 | Letter plates must be removed and fitted with fire rated letter plates | | | |
| 7.0 Floor Signage | 7.0 | | Checks Y/N | Sign | Date |
| | 7.1 | Signage must be the new signs, holes behind signs must be filled with proprietary fire mastic, drop signage to 1.1m. | | | |
| | 7.2 | Where unable to drop to 1.1m owing to fire fighting equipment - relocate | | | |
| 8.0 Vent Terminals | 8.0 | | Checks Y/N | Sign | Date |
| | 8.1 | Fit Fire Rated Non-Combustible Board over open vents at the foot of staircase. Boards to be mechanically fixed and bedded/ sealed on intumescent mastic. | | | |
| 9.0 Basement Works | 9.0 | | Checks Y/N | Sign | Date |
| | 9.1 | All vertical holes, service penetration surrounds and voids to be sealed with proprietary intumescent materials as appropriate. | | | |
| 10.0 Boxing In of Services | 10.0 | | Checks Y/N | Sign | Date |
| | 10.1 | Remove the existing mdf timber framework and boxing in to service duct in the common parts. Supply and fit new Metsec steel framework and clad in a 1 hour fire rated material. | | | |

APPENDIX C

REMEDIAL WORKS AOV COMMISSIONING REPORTS

SMOKE VENTILATION SYSTEM (AOV) INSPECTION CERTIFICATE

| | | | |
|--|---|---|--|
| Client | London Borough of Camden | Log Book checked & updated? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No |
| Site Address | 1 - 161 Burnham | Log Book Location | |
| | Fellows Road, London | | |
| Post Code | NW3 3JR | Tests/checks and inspections carried out in accordance with the relevant British Standard and/or the Manufacturer's guidelines | |
| UPRN No. | | Smoke Vents Cleaned and tested? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| Our Job Ref No. | 2190671/1 | Interlinked detection tested? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| Client Job Ref No. | | Firemans Control Switch(es) tested? | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| Service Type | | Control Panel checked (including connections)? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Annual (100%) | <input type="checkbox"/> Monthly | Battery backup checked? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Bi - Annual (50%) | <input type="checkbox"/> Weekly | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3 Monthly (25%) | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Instructed Remedial Works | | |

| | |
|--|--|
| Description of Work Carried Out / Engineer's Report / Variations | |
| Camden Instruction | |
| Following instructions from London Borough of Camden for Openview to attend site and check which AOV vents that were failing to open. For those AOV vents not opening to manually leave these vents in a open position and then check the rest of the AOV vents were still operating correctly. These works were to be undertaken on 17 August 2017. | |
| Openview Works | |
| Openview engineers attended site and tested the AOV system to establish which AOV vents were failing to open. Openview engineers and in communication with Colt agreed a method of work to test the AOV system to ascertain those AOV vents that were failing to open. None within Burnham failed to open correctly and left operational. | |
| Continuation Report Sheet Used? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No | |

| | |
|--|---|
| Inspection Completed? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No (Give details below) | Further Works or Quote required? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes (Give details below) <input type="checkbox"/> No |
| Follow-on works already agreed and ordered with Colt. | |

| MATERIALS USED | | | |
|--------------------|------|-------|-------------|
| Qty | Make | Model | Description |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| MATERIALS REQUIRED | | | |
| Qty | Make | Model | Description |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |

Where applicable to the work carried out above, I/We being the competent person(s) responsible for the servicing of the system(s) described above certify that the work complies to the best of my/our knowledge and belief with the recommendations of the relevant British Standard and/or to the Manufacturer's guidelines, except for the variations if any stated in this certificate. For and on behalf of OpenView.

| | | |
|----------------------|-------|--------------|
| Engineer's Signature | Print | Date 17/8/17 |
|----------------------|-------|--------------|

I confirm that the above works have been carried out to my satisfaction and accept responsibility for the system including any defects that have been brought to my attention as or on behalf of the nominated Responsible Person and/or Client.

| | | |
|---|-------|------|
| Customer's Signature | Print | Date |
| Customer unavailable to sign <input type="checkbox"/> Reason: | | |

Colt International Ltd - Service
Colt House
Ridgeway Office Park
Bedford Road
Petersfield
GU32 3QF
Telephone +44 (0)2392 451111
Fax +44 (0)2392 454220



Completion Certificate

Contract

Openview Security

Site address

Chalcott Estate – Burnham
Adelaide Road
London
NW3 3JX

Our Reference: 763721/ 763722/ 763723/ 763724/ 763725 / SC1/2105

Customer No. 0000151135

The following repair work was completed on 29/09/17 and is acceptable.

Description

The following repairs were completed as per the quotation numbers.

Quotation 728879

The Coltlite window actuator junction boxes have been re-finished and terminated correctly.

Quotation 728880

The batteries for the 4th, 6th and 16th floor BBU have been replaced

Quotation 728881

Smoke head cable entry's have been sealed with a fire stopping sealant.

Quotation 728882

The software program has been modified to incorporate fault indication from the Battery Back Up Units and rewiring completed.

Quotation 728883

Retest of system has been completed.

Also additionally 11 CSIO boxes have been installed as noted required after works had begun.

Signed on behalf of customer

Signed on behalf of Colt Service

.....

Name:.....

Name: Simon Payne.....

Date:.....

Date: 04/10/17.....



SMOKE VENTILATION SYSTEM (AOV) INSPECTION CERTIFICATE

OpenView Group
Openview House
Chesham Close
Romford RM7 7PJ
t: 0845 071 9110
f: 0845 071 9111

| | | | |
|--|--|---|--|
| Client | London Borough of Camden | Log Book checked & updated? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No |
| Site Address | 1 - 161 Taplow | Log Book Location | |
| | Adelaide Road, London | | |
| Post Code | NW3 3NY | Tests/checks and inspections carried out in accordance with the relevant British Standard and/or the Manufactures guidelines | |
| UPRN No. | | Smoke Vents Cleaned and tested? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| Our Job Ref No. | 2190668/1 | Interlinked detection tested? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| Client Job Ref No. | | Firemans Control Switch(es) tested? | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| Service Type | | Control Panel checked (including connections)? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Annual (100%) | <input type="checkbox"/> Monthly | Battery backup checked? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Bi - Annual (50%) | <input type="checkbox"/> Weekly | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3 Monthly (25%) | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Instructed Remedial Works | | |

| | |
|---|---|
| Description of Work Carried Out / Engineer's Report / Variations | |
| Camden Instruction | |
| Following instructions from London Borough of Camden for Openview to attend site and check which AOV vents that were failing to open. For those AOV vents not opening to manually leave these vents in a open position and then check the rest of the AOV vents were still operating correctly. These works were to be undertaken on 17 August 2017. | |
| Openview Works | |
| Openview engineers attended site and tested the AOV system to establish which AOV vents were failing to open. Openview engineers and in communication with Colt agreed a method of work to test the AOV system to ascertain those AOV vents that were failing to open. Once identified these AOV vents were manually left in the open position with signage stating "UNDER MAINTENANCE DO NOT CLOSE VENT". The Manager of the security company was notified of the works undertaken and importance to keep the vents open. The AOV vents left open: Floor 19 (Rear Window). | |
| The AOV system was rechecked from the control panel to ensure the rest of the AOV vents were operational. | |
| | Continuation Report Sheet Used? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No |

| | |
|---|--|
| Inspection Completed? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No (Give details below) | Further Works or Quote required? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes (Give details below) <input type="checkbox"/> No |
| Follow-on works already agreed and ordered with Colt. | |
| | |
| | |
| | |

| MATERIALS USED | | | |
|----------------|------|-------|-------------|
| Qty | Make | Model | Description |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |

| MATERIALS REQUIRED | | | |
|--------------------|------|-------|-------------|
| Qty | Make | Model | Description |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |

Where applicable to the work carried out above, I/We being the competent person(s) responsible for the servicing of the system(s) described above certify that the work complies to the best of my/our knowledge and belief with the recommendations of the relevant British Standard and/or to the Manufacturer's guidelines, except for the variations if any stated in this certificate. For and on behalf of OpenView.

| | | |
|----------------------|-------|---------|
| Engineer's Signature | Print | Date |
| | | 17/8/17 |

I confirm that the above works have been carried out to my satisfaction and accept responsibility for the system including any defects that have been brought to my attention as or on behalf of the nominated Responsible Person and/or Client.

| | | |
|----------------------|-------|------|
| Customer's Signature | Print | Date |
| | | |

Customer unavailable to sign Reason:

Colt International Ltd - Service
Colt House
Ridgeway Office Park
Bedford Road
Petersfield
GU32 3QF
Telephone +44 (0)2392 451111
Fax +44 (0)2392 454220



Completion Certificate

Contract

Openview Security

Site address

Chalcott Estate – Taplow
Adelaide Road
London
NW3 3JX

Our Reference: 763721/ 763722/ 763723/ 763724/ 763725 / SC1/2105

Customer No. 0000151135

The following repair work was completed on 29/09/17 and is acceptable.

Description

The following repairs were completed as per the quotation numbers.

Quotation 728907

The Coltlite window actuator junction boxes have been re-finished and terminated correctly.

Quotation 728908

The batteries for the BBUs have been replaced.

Quotation 728909

Smoke head cable entry's have been sealed with a fire stopping sealant.

Quotation 728910

The software program has been modified to incorporate fault indication from the Battery Back Up Units and rewiring completed.

Quotation 728911

Level 19 corridor Coltlite window motor replaced damaged cable.

Quotation 728912

Level 12 Stair Coltlite window actuator replaced.

Quotation 728913

Retest of system has been completed.

Also additionally 11 CSIO boxes have been installed as noted required after works had begun.

Signed on behalf of customer

Signed on behalf of Colt Service

.....

Name:.....

Name: Simon Payne.....

Date:.....

Date: 04/10/17.....



SMOKE VENTILATION SYSTEM (AOV) INSPECTION CERTIFICATE

OpenView Group
Openview House
Chesham Close
Romford RM7 7PJ
t: 0845 071 9110
f: 0845 071 9111

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|--|---------------------------------|---|
| Client | London Borough of Camden | Log Book checked & updated? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No | | |
| Site Address | 1 - 158 Dorney Adelaide Road, London | Log Book Location | | | |
| Post Code | NW3 3NY | Tests/checks and inspections carried out in accordance with the relevant British Standard and/or the Manufactureres guidelines | | | |
| UPRN No. | | | | | |
| Our Job Ref No. | 2190676/1 | | | Smoke Vents Cleaned and tested? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| Client Job Ref No. | | | | Interlinked detection tested? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| Service Type <input type="checkbox"/> Annual (100%) <input type="checkbox"/> Monthly <input type="checkbox"/> Bi - Annual (50%) <input type="checkbox"/> Weekly <input type="checkbox"/> 3 Monthly (25%) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Instructed Remedial Works | | Firemans Control Switch(es) tested? | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> N/A | | |
| | | Control Panel checked (including connections)? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> N/A | | |
| | | Battery backup checked? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> N/A | | |

Description of Work Carried Out / Engineer's Report / Variations

Camden Instruction

Following instructions from London Borough of Camden for Openview to attend site and check which AOV vents that were failing to open. For those AOV vents not opening to manually leave these vents in a open position and then check the rest of the AOV vents were still operating correctly. These works were to be undertaken on 17 August 2017.

Openview Works

Openview engineers attended site and tested the AOV system to establish which AOV vents were failing to open. Openview engineers and in communication with Colt agreed a method of work to test the AOV system to ascertain those AOV vents that were failing to open. Once identified these AOV vents were manually left in the open position with signage stating "UNDER MAINTENANCE DO NOT CLOSE VENT". The Manager of the security company was notified of the works undertaken and importance to keep the vents open. The AOV vents left open: Floor 8 (Rear Window) and Floor 20 (West Window).

The AOV system was rechecked from the control panel to ensure the rest of the AOV vents were operational.

| | |
|---------------------------------|---|
| Continuation Report Sheet Used? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No |
|---------------------------------|---|

| | | | |
|-----------------------|---|----------------------------------|---|
| Inspection Completed? | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No (Give details below) | Further Works or Quote required? | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes (Give details below) <input type="checkbox"/> No |
|-----------------------|---|----------------------------------|---|

Follow-on works already agreed and ordered with Colt.

MATERIALS USED

| Qty | Make | Model | Description |
|-----|------|-------|-------------|
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |

MATERIALS REQUIRED

| Qty | Make | Model | Description |
|-----|------|-------|-------------|
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |

Where applicable to the work carried out above, I/We being the competent person(s) responsible for the servicing of the system(s) described above certify that the work complies to the best of my/our knowledge and belief with the recommendations of the relevant British Standard and/or to the Manufacturer's guidelines, expect for the variations if any stated in this certificate. For and on behalf of OpenView.

| | | | | | |
|----------------------|--|-------|--|------|---------|
| Engineer's Signature | | Print | | Date | 17/8/17 |
|----------------------|--|-------|--|------|---------|

I confirm that the above works have been carried out to my satisfaction and accept responsibility for the system including any defects that have been brought to my attention as or on behalf of the nominated Responsible Person and/or Client.

| | | | | | |
|----------------------|--|-------|--|------|--|
| Customer's Signature | | Print | | Date | |
|----------------------|--|-------|--|------|--|

Customer unavailable to sign Reason:

Colt International Ltd - Service
Colt House
Ridgeway Office Park
Bedford Road
Petersfield
GU32 3QF
Telephone +44 (0)2392 451111
Fax +44 (0)2392 454220



Completion Certificate

Contract

Openview Security

Site address

Chalcott Estate – Dorney
Adelaide Road
London
NW3 3JX

Our Reference: 763752/ 763753 / 763754/ 763755/ 763756 / SC1/2105

Customer No. 0000151137

The following repair work was completed on 29/09/17 and is acceptable.

Description

The following repairs were completed as per the quotation numbers.

Quotation 728900

The OPV panel batteries require replacement (as of 21st July 2017).

Quotation 728901

Smoke head cable entry's have been sealed with a fire stopping sealant.

Quotation 728903

The 3 unused break glass switches on each floor have been removed and disconnected.

Quotation 728905

The software program has been modified to incorporate fault indication from the Battery Back Up Units and rewiring completed.

Quotation 728906

Retest of system has been completed.


Also additionally 11 CSIO boxes have been installed as noted required after works had begun.

Quotation 728961 for Coltlite Windows is still to be completed as awaiting arrival of the Windows.

Signed on behalf of customer

Signed on behalf of Colt Service

.....

..... 

Name:.....

Name: Simon Payne.....

Date:.....

Date:04/10/17.....

SMOKE VENTILATION SYSTEM (AOV) INSPECTION CERTIFICATE

| | | | |
|--|---|---|--|
| Client | London Borough of Camden | Log Book checked & updated? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No |
| Site Address | 1 - 161 Bray Fellows Road, London | Log Book Location | |
| Post Code | NW3 3JX | Tests/checks and inspections carried out in accordance with the relevant British Standard and/or the Manufactureres guidelines | |
| UPRN No. | | Smoke Vents Cleaned and tested? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| Our Job Ref No. | 2190673/1 | Interlinked detection tested? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| Client Job Ref No. | | Firemans Control Switch(es) tested? | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| Service Type | | Control Panel checked (including connections)? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Annual (100%) | <input type="checkbox"/> Monthly | Battery backup checked? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Bi - Annual (50%) | <input type="checkbox"/> Weekly | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3 Monthly (25%) | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Instructed Remedial Works | | |

| | |
|--|---|
| Description of Work Carried Out / Engineer's Report / Variations | |
| Camden Instruction | |
| Following instructions from London Borough of Camden for Openview to attend site and check which AOV vents that were failing to open. For those AOV vents not opening to manually leave these vents in a open position and then check the rest of the AOV vents were still operating correctly. These works were to be undertaken on 17 August 2017. | |
| Openview Works | |
| Openview engineers attended site and tested the AOV system to establish which AOV vents were failing to open. Openview engineers and in communication with Colt agreed a method of work to test the AOV system to ascertain those AOV vents that were failing to open. Once identified these AOV vents were manually left in the open position with signage stating "UNDER MAINTENANCE DO NOT CLOSE VENT". The Manager of the security company was notified of the works undertaken and importance to keep the vents open. The AOV vents left open: Floor 7 (West Window) and Floor 9 (West Window). | |
| The AOV system was rechecked from the control panel to ensure the rest of the AOV vents were operational. | |
| | Continuation Report Sheet Used? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No |

| | |
|---|--|
| Inspection Completed? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No (Give details below) | Further Works or Quote required? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes (Give details below) <input type="checkbox"/> No |
| Follow-on works already agreed and ordered with Colt. | |
| | |
| | |
| | |

| MATERIALS USED | | | |
|----------------|------|-------|-------------|
| Qty | Make | Model | Description |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |

| MATERIALS REQUIRED | | | |
|--------------------|------|-------|-------------|
| Qty | Make | Model | Description |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |

Where applicable to the work carried out above, I/We being the competent person(s) responsible for the servicing of the system(s) described above certify that the work complies to the best of my/our knowledge and belief with the recommendations of the relevant British Standard and/or to the Manufacturer's guidelines, except for the variations if any stated in this certificate. For and on behalf of OpenView.

| | | | |
|--|-------|------|---------|
| Engineer's Signature | Print | Date | 17/8/17 |
| I confirm that the above works have been carried out to my satisfaction and accept responsibility for the system including any defects that have been brought to my attention as or on behalf of the nominated Responsible Person and/or Client. | | | |
| Customer's Signature | Print | Date | |
| Customer unavailable to sign <input type="checkbox"/> Reason: | | | |

Colt International Ltd - Service
Colt House
Ridgeway Office Park
Bedford Road
Petersfield
GU32 3QF
Telephone +44 (0)2392 451111
Fax +44 (0)2392 454220



Completion Certificate

Contract

Openview Security

Site address

Chalcott Estate – Bray
Adelaide Road
London
NW3 3JX

Our Reference: 763740/ 763742/ 763743/763744/ 763745/ SC1/2105

Customer No. 0000151147

The following repair work was completed on 29/09/17 and is acceptable.

Description

The following repairs were completed as per the quotation numbers.

Quotation 728886

The Coltlite window actuator junction boxes on levels 7, 11, 12, 13, 15 and 17 have been re-finished and terminated correctly.

Quotation 728887

All batteries replaced.

Quotation 728888

Smoke head cable entry's have been sealed with a fire stopping sealant.

Quotation 728889

The software program has been modified to incorporate fault indication from the Battery Back Up Units and rewiring completed.

Quotation 728892

Retest of system has been completed.

Also additionally 11 CSIO boxes have been installed as noted required after works had begun

Quotation 728960 for Coltlite Windows is still to be completed as awaiting arrival of the Windows.

Signed on behalf of customer

Signed on behalf of Colt Service

.....

..... 

Name:.....

Name: Simon Payne.....

Date:.....

Date: 04/10/17.....

SMOKE VENTILATION SYSTEM (AOV) INSPECTION CERTIFICATE

| | | | |
|--|---|---|--|
| Client | London Borough of Camden | Log Book checked & updated? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No |
| Site Address | 1 - 72 Blashford | Log Book Location | |
| | Adelaide Road, London | | |
| Post Code | NW3 3RX | Tests/checks and inspections carried out in accordance with the relevant British Standard and/or the Manufactureres guidelines | |
| UPRN No. | | | |
| Our Job Ref No. | 2190677/1 | | |
| Client Job Ref No. | | | |
| Service Type | | Smoke Vents Cleaned and tested? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Annual (100%) | <input type="checkbox"/> Monthly | Interlinked detection tested? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Bi - Annual (50%) | <input type="checkbox"/> Weekly | Firemans Control Switch(es) tested? | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3 Monthly (25%) | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Instructed Remedial Works | Control Panel checked (including connections)? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| | | Battery backup checked? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |

| | |
|--|---|
| Description of Work Carried Out / Engineer's Report / Variations | |
| Camden Instruction | |
| Following instructions from London Borough of Camden for Openview to attend site and check which AOV vents that were failing to open. For those AOV vents not opening to manually leave these vents in a open position and then check the rest of the AOV vents were still operating correctly. These works were to be undertaken on 17 August 2017. | |
| Openview Works | |
| Openview engineers attended site and tested the AOV system to establish which AOV vents were failing to open. Openview engineers and in communication with Colt agreed a method of work to test the AOV system to ascertain those AOV vents that were failing to open. Once identified these AOV vents were manually left in the open position with signage stating "UNDER MAINTENANCE DO NOT CLOSE VENT". The Manager of the security company was notified of the works undertaken and importance to keep the vents open. The AOV vents left open: Floor 5, Floor 6 Floor 15 and Floor 16 . | |
| The AOV system was rechecked from the control panel to ensure the rest of the AOV vents were operational. | |
| | Continuation Report Sheet Used? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No |

| | |
|---|--|
| Inspection Completed? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No (Give details below) | Further Works or Quote required? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes (Give details below) <input type="checkbox"/> No |
| Follow-on works already agreed and ordered with Colt. | |
| | |
| | |
| | |

| MATERIALS USED | | | |
|----------------|------|-------|-------------|
| Qty | Make | Model | Description |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |

| MATERIALS REQUIRED | | | |
|--------------------|------|-------|-------------|
| Qty | Make | Model | Description |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |

Where applicable to the work carried out above, I/We being the competent person(s) responsible for the servicing of the system(s) described above certify that the work complies to the best of my/our knowledge and belief with the recommendations of the relevant British Standard and/or to the Manufacturer's guidelines, except for the variations if any stated in this certificate. For and on behalf of OpenView.

| | | |
|----------------------|-------|--------------|
| Engineer's Signature | Print | Date 17/8/17 |
|----------------------|-------|--------------|

I confirm that the above works have been carried out to my satisfaction and accept responsibility for the system including any defects that have been brought to my attention as or on behalf of the nominated Responsible Person and/or Client.

| | | |
|----------------------|-------|------|
| Customer's Signature | Print | Date |
|----------------------|-------|------|

Customer unavailable to sign Reason:

Colt International Ltd - Service
Colt House
Ridgeway Office Park
Bedford Road
Petersfield
GU32 3QF
Telephone +44 (0)2392 451111
Fax +44 (0)2392 454220



Completion Certificate

Contract

Openview Security

Site address

Chalcott Estate – Blashford
Adelaide Road
London
NW3 3JX

Our Reference: 763746/ 763748/ 763749/ 763750/ SC1/2105

Customer No. 0000151144

The following repair work was completed on 29/09/17 and is acceptable.

Description

The following repairs were completed as per the quotation numbers.

Quotation 728894

The software program has been modified to incorporate fault indication from the Battery Back Up Units and rewiring completed. 5th floor window actuator replaced.

Quotation 728896

Replaced the 10A Battery Back Units on Levels 6 and 12.

Quotation 728897

Replaced the cable currently broken on 15th floor

Quotation 728898

Retest of system has been completed.

Also additionally 4 CSIO boxes have been installed as noted required after works had begun

Quotation 728958 for ColtLite Windows is still to be completed as awaiting arrival of the Windows

Signed on behalf of customer

Signed on behalf of Colt Service

.....

..... 

Name:.....

Name: Simon Payne.....

Date:.....

Date: 29/09/17.....

APPENDIX D

THIRD PARTY SIGN OFF (EURO COMPLIANCE)



90 Milton Avenue
Barnet
Herts
EN5 2EU

Mr George Loureda
Head of Building Control
Camden Council

4th October 2017

Dear Mr Loureda

Reference – Euro Compliance - Validation / Sign Off at Chalcot Estate NW3

I hereby validate that the relevant works, as identified in the attached on-site sign off sheets for each of the blocks, have been inspected and signed off by Euro Compliance representatives as per the signatures shown for attachments:

1. EC01-Blashford Sign Off Sheet - Building Control & Euro Compliance 1
2. EC02-Dorney Sign Off Sheet - Building Control & Euro Compliance
3. EC03-Burnham Sign Off Sheet - Building Control & Euro Compliance
4. EC04-Bray Sign Off Sheet - Building Control & Euro Compliance
5. EC05-Taplow Sign Off Sheet - Building Control & Euro Compliance



Paul Williams G.I.Fire.E, M.I.F.S.M, M.I.I.R.S.M
Managing Director
Euro Compliance Ltd



Registered Office: 90 Milton Avenue, Barnet Herts, EN5 2EU No. 06353434



Please note; appendices referred to in the main report have been redacted in accordance to the Data Protection Act 1998.

APPENDIX E

BUILDING CONTROL SIGN OFF

Date: 9th September 2017
Enquiries to: George Loureda
Our Ref: GL/Chalcots/Lambeth
Telephone: 020 7974 6949
E Mail: George.Loureda@Camden.gov.uk

London Borough of Camden
4th Floor
5 Pancras Square
London
NC1 4AG

Lambeth Council
Mike Baker
Head of Building Control
Phoenix House
10 Wandsworth Road
London
SW8 2LL

Phone: 020 7974 6949
George.Loureda@camden.gov.uk
www.camden.gov.uk

Re: Building Control Validation of the On Site Sign Off Sheets for the Fire Safety Works to Burham House, Bray House, Dorney House, Taplow House & Blashford House, forming the Chalcots Estate

Dear Mike

Following completion of the recommended Fire Safety Works to the above blocks and in your role as independent adjudicator, I would be grateful if you could sign this letter to validate that the relevant works as signed off on site by Lambeth Council, Building Control Officers, have been undertaken as per the sign off sheets attached.

We appreciate that your Building Control Offices may have only inspected and signed off parts of the works on each of the blocks, however the requirement for your signature below is to validate that the signatures of your representatives, as detailed in the sign off sheet, are correct and are appropriate to the particular areas of work that they inspected and signed off for each block.


Building Control Validation / Sign Off

I hereby validate that the relevant works, as identified in the attached on-site sign off sheets for each of the blocks, have been inspected and signed off by Lambeth Council's, Building Control Officers as per the signatures shown:


.....
Mike Baker
Head of Building Control for Lambeth Council

Many thanks for your cooperation on this matter and your assistance throughout this process.

Yours sincerely,



George Loureda
Head of Service
Engineering and Building Control Services
Supporting Communities

Date: 9th September 2017
Enquiries to: George Loureda
Our Ref: GL/Chalcots/Westminster
Telephone: 020 7974 6949
E Mail: George.Loureda@Camden.gov.uk

 **Camden**
London Borough of Camden
4th Floor
5 Pancras Square
London
NC1 4AG

City of Westminster
Tony Fenton
District Surveyors
20th Floor
Portland House
Bressenden Place
London
SW1E 5RS

Phone: 020 7974 6949
George.Loureda@camden.gov.uk
www.camden.gov.uk

Re: Building Control Validation of the On Site Sign Off Sheets for the Fire Safety Works to Bray House, Dorney House and Taplow House, forming part of the Chalcots Estate

Dear Tony

Following completion of the recommended Fire Safety Works to the above blocks and in your role as independent adjudicator, I would be grateful if you could sign this letter to validate that the relevant works as signed off on site by City of Westminster, Building Control Officers, have been undertaken as per the sign off sheets attached.

We appreciate that your Building Control Officers may have only inspected and signed off parts of the works on each of the blocks, however the requirement for your signature below is to validate that the signatures of your representatives, as detailed in the sign off sheet, are correct and are appropriate to the particular areas of work that they inspected and signed off for each block.


Building Control Validation / Sign Off

I hereby validate that the relevant works, as identified below have been inspected and signed off by City of Westminster, Building Control Officers as per the signatures shown as noted below:-

Garnet Gordon has signed for 6th floor Bray House.

Hassan Lashkariani has signed for GF through to 17th Floor Taplow House and 6th floor to 11th floor Dorney House


James McCabe Inspected 18th floor through to 22 Floor Taplow House but this was signed off by another professional. Further details of Westminster City Council Building Control areas of surveys can be found in the letters sent previously from Tony Fenton



.....
Julian Tanton
Head of Building Control City of Westminster

Many thanks for your cooperation on this matter and your assistance throughout this process.

Yours sincerely,




George Loureda
Head of Service
Engineering and Building Control Services
Supporting Communities

Please note; appendices referred to in the main report have been redacted in accordance to the Data Protection Act 1998.

APPENDIX F

LONDON FIRE BRIGADE SIGN OFF



Chief Executive Officer
London Borough of Camden
Town Hall
Judd Street
London
WC1H 9JE

London Fire and Emergency Planning
Authority runs the London Fire Brigade

Date 16th November 2017
Our Ref 02/015738/RP

Dear Sir/Madam

REGULATORY REFORM (FIRE SAFETY) ORDER 2005

Premises: Bray, Fellows Road, London NW3 3JX

Further to the recent inspection by the Authority I confirm that the works specified in the Enforcement Notice dated **12th July 2017**, issued by this Authority in respect of the above mentioned premises have been satisfactorily completed within the specified time limit. The Enforcement Notice has been complied with and at the time of the inspection the premises were deemed to comply with the above Order.

The premises are amongst those identified as utilising Aluminium Composite Material cladding. Additional fire safety measures to reasonably secure the safety of residents are necessary in these circumstances. These measures are described in the Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG) letter of 22 June 2017 to Chief Executives of Local Authority and Housing Associations. At the time of our inspection the measures as recommended by CLG were noted as not having been fully implemented. These measures will need to be reviewed and amended so that they are in line with the measures recommended by CLG and remain in place until such time as the ACM cladding is removed.


Should the circumstances change in the future affecting the risk to persons in case of fire, the risk assessment of the premises should be reviewed by a competent person and the significant findings recorded and addressed.

The Authority will continue to undertake monitoring reviews in respect of the general fire precautions at the premises and the additional measures in place due to the ACM cladding.

Any queries regarding this letter should be addressed to the person named below. If you are dissatisfied in any way with the response given, please ask to speak to the Team Leader quoting our reference.

Yours faithfully

Signed:




Assistant Commissioner
(The Officer appointed for the purpose)

for Assistant Commissioner (Fire Safety)

Directorate of Operations
FSR-AdminSupport@london-fire.gov.uk

Reply to Kirsty Mclean
Direct T 020 8555 1200 ext 34311 or 89171

Cc: Chief Executive Officer, London Borough of Camden, 5 Pancras Square, London N1C 4AG
Jenny Rowlands, London Borough of Camden, 5 Pancras Square, London N1C 4AG



Chief Executive Officer
London Borough of Camden
Town Hall
Judd Street
London
WC1H 9JE

London Fire and Emergency Planning
Authority runs the London Fire Brigade

Date 16th November 2017
Our Ref 02/223459/RP

Dear Sir/Madam

REGULATORY REFORM (FIRE SAFETY) ORDER 2005

Premises: Blashford, Adelaide Road, London NW3 3RX

Further to the recent inspection by the Authority I confirm that the works specified in the Enforcement Notice dated **12th July 2017**, issued by this Authority in respect of the above mentioned premises have been satisfactorily completed within the specified time limit. The Enforcement Notice has been complied with and at the time of the inspection the premises were deemed to comply with the above Order.

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
Assistant Commissioner
(The Officer appointed for the purpose)

for Assistant Commissioner (Fire Safety)

Directorate of Operations
FSR-AdminSupport@london-fire.gov.uk

Reply to Kirsty Mclean
Direct T 020 8555 1200 ext 34311 or 89171

Cc: Chief Executive Officer, London Borough of Camden, 5 Pancras Square, London N1C 4AG
Jenny Rowlands, London Borough of Camden, 5 Pancras Square, London N1C 4AG



London Fire and Emergency Planning
Authority runs the London Fire Brigade

Date 16th November 2017
Our Ref 02/014299/RP

Chief Executive Officer
London Borough of Camden
Town Hall
Judd Street
London
WC1H 9JE

Dear Sir/Madam

REGULATORY REFORM (FIRE SAFETY) ORDER 2005

Premises: Taplow, Adelaide Road, London NW3 3NX

Further to the recent inspection by the Authority I confirm that the works specified in the Enforcement Notice dated **12th July 2017**, issued by this Authority in respect of the above mentioned premises have been satisfactorily completed within the specified time limit. The Enforcement Notice has been complied with and at the time of the inspection the premises were deemed to comply with the above Order.

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
Assistant Commissioner
(The Officer appointed for the purpose)

for Assistant Commissioner (Fire Safety)

Directorate of Operations
FSR-AdminSupport@london-fire.gov.uk

Reply to Kirsty Mclean
Direct T 020 8555 1200 ext 34311 or 89171

Cc: Chief Executive Officer, London Borough of Camden, 5 Pancras Square, London N1C 4AG
Jenny Rowlands, London Borough of Camden, 5 Pancras Square, London N1C 4AG



Chief Executive Officer
London Borough of Camden
Town Hall
Judd Street
London
WC1H 9JE

London Fire and Emergency Planning
Authority runs the London Fire Brigade

Date 16th November 2017
Our Ref 02/015258/RP

Dear Sir/Madam

REGULATORY REFORM (FIRE SAFETY) ORDER 2005

Premises: Dorney, Adelaide Road, London NW3 3PP

Further to the recent inspection by the Authority I confirm that the works specified in the Enforcement Notice dated **12th July 2017**, issued by this Authority in respect of the above mentioned premises have been satisfactorily completed within the specified time limit. The Enforcement Notice has been complied with and at the time of the inspection the premises were deemed to comply with the above Order.


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
Assistant Commissioner
(The Officer appointed for the purpose)

for Assistant Commissioner (Fire Safety)

Directorate of Operations
FSR-AdminSupport@london-fire.gov.uk

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Jenny Rowlands, London Borough of Camden, 5 Pancras Square, London N1C 4AG



Chief Executive Officer
London Borough of Camden
Town Hall
Judd Street
London
WC1H 9JE

Dear Sir/Madam

REGULATORY REFORM (FIRE SAFETY) ORDER 2005

Premises: Burnham, Fellows Road, London NW3 3JR

Further to the recent inspection by the Authority I confirm that the works specified in the Enforcement Notice dated **12th July 2017**, issued by this Authority in respect of the above mentioned premises have been satisfactorily completed within the specified time limit. The Enforcement Notice has been complied with and at the time of the inspection the premises were deemed to comply with the above Order.

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
APPENDIX G

GENERIC PHOTOGRAPHYS OF TYPICAL UPGRADE WORKS

CHALCOTS ESTATE – PHOTOS



PHOTOGRAPH 1 – Typical Fire Door with Door Closure



PHOTOGRAPH 2 – Typical Retrofit Intumescent Strip to Fire Door

CHALCOTS ESTATE – PHOTOS



PHOTOGRAPH 3 – Typical Fire Door Hinges



PHOTOGRAPH 4 – Typical Communal Fire Door

CHALCOTS ESTATE – PHOTOS



PHOTOGRAPH 5 – Typical Corridor Showing Compartmentation Works to Ceiling & Upgrade Works to Fire Doors



PHOTOGRAPH 6 – New 60 Minute Compartmentation to Ceilings

CHALCOTS ESTATE – PHOTOS



PHOTOGRAPH 7 – New 60 Minute Compartmentation to Ceilings & to Window Surrounds



PHOTOGRAPH 8 – Existing Surrounds to Communal Windows

CHALCOTS ESTATE – PHOTOS



PHOTOGRAPH 9 – Compartmentation Works to Window Surround & AOV Mechanism



PHOTOGRAPH 10 – Typical Communal Window with AOV

CHALCOTS ESTATE – PHOTOS



PHOTOGRAPH 11 – Typical Mestec Frame Supporting 60 Minute Fire Compartmentation Plasterboard




PHOTOGRAPH 12 – Compartmentation Works to Lift Lobby Areas

CHALCOTS ESTATE – PHOTOS



PHOTOGRAPH 13 – Fire Proofing to Service Penetrations



PHOTOGRAPH 14 – Fire Proofing to Service Penetrations

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This independent report was presented to
Camden Council by Marian Harrington, 25 June 2018.